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The report describes a research investigation into fault tolerant 
strategies w ithin a real time control system. Methods for increasing 
the re lia b ility  of a system other than through the use of fault tolerance 
have also been reviewed. The study which concentrated on a Recovery 
Block structure is separated into two parts, that is, a single and a 
distributed processing system. The single processor study involved 
modelling a subset of the control system; error recovery strategies 
are presented here as additions to the basic Recovery Block structure. 
Fault injection logic was specially designed and built in order that the 
recovery strategies could be tested under extreme operating conditions.
The distributed processing study is an extension of the single 
processor research. Three types of recovery ore investigated to 
increase system ava ilab ility ; local recovery, global recovery and task 
swapping. The philosophy used in the distributed processing study 
was always to attempt recovery on a local basis, that is to prevent 
the propagation of faults to other microprocessors within the system. 
Global recovery is established as a method of maintaining continued 
safe operation when local recovery or communication between processors 
foils. The use of a standby processor system for dynamic task swapping 
is shown to give continued systems operation under conditions which 
would normally cause a catastrophic crash in non redundant systems.
The overall conclusion of the research is that fault recovery 
must be localised to prevent fault propagation from one process to the 
following process, with no distinction as to whether the communicating 
processes are in the same or different microprocessor subsystems, 
and that this can be successfully achieved in a real time environment by 
the use of a Recovery Block structure.
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Chapter 1. introduction.
With the introduction of low cost sophisticated processing, the use 
of microprocessors has become an important part of the industrial scene, 
with LSI and VLSI devices often replacing analogue or large digital 
equipment. In addition to small size and high processing power, a 
microprocessor based system provides system fle x ib ility  with the 
capability of system reconfiguration. A growing realisation of the new 
problems that the change to microprocessors has brought about is now 
evident; the consequence of a system failure in applications such as 
satellite attituds control is severe, leading to a need for analysis and 
design techniques to be adopted in order to improve system re liab ility  
and ava ilab ility . Such system failures can originate at either the 
design or manufacturing stages or in operational use. Design errors 
typically include systems analysis, hardware design, incomplete 
specification, mismatch of hardware and software, software design and 
coding. An analysis of program errors points to the fact that 
incomplete, inconsistent or ambiguous software requirement 
specifications are a significant problem,^
The re liab ility  of a system may be improved by a combination of 
different techniques which fall into three main categories, fault 
avoidance, fault removal and fault tolerance. Chapter 2 reviews the 
considered techniques which are summarised below.
The avoidance of faults at the analysis and design stage can be 
carried out by the use of a formal specification language and associated 
design techniques. Fault tree analysis and failure modes effects 
analysis (FMEA) can be used to  detect critical parts of the system; 
certain failure modes can then be eliminated a t the design stage.
Fault removal techniques involve the construction and integrated 
testing of hardware and software prototypes. In addition the use of 
structured software enables a more thorough testing of the system to be 
carried out. The use of correctness proofs of software is beginning to
emerge but îs unlikely to replace prototype testing.
Fault tolerance is a further technique whereby redundant hardware 
and software is used for the protection and recovery from faults.
The need for high re liab ility  can be justified in systems where human 
life  is at stake, where maintenance is not possible or in situations 
where a large financial loss results from a system crash.
1 ,1 . Research Objectives.
A method ot increasing the ava ilab ility  of a given system is by 
the addition of redundant hardware and software to provide protection 
against and recovery from faults within and external to the system.
It is important that the implementation of redundancy techniques is 
considered in terms of cost effectiveness, weight and power requirements; 
for example massive redundancy may not be a cost effective solution 
if  only a marginal increase in re lia b ility  and ava ilab ility  is obtained.
The aim of the research study was therefore to investigate the 
possibility of increasing the ava ilab ility  of a given system by the 
inclusion of fault tolerant mechanisms for the protection and recovery 
from predefined faults. The aim can best be divided into constituent 
parts as follows:
(a) To establish good design practices based upon a practical 
rather than a mathematical approach.
(b) To establish a simple but obvious structure for system 
recovery.
(c) To establish design criteria for reliable inter-task 
communication within a single microprocessor system.
(d) To establish a design philosophy for message passing between 
microprocessors in a distributed system in order to inhibit the propagation 
of faults.
The research entailed an in itial study of different strategies that could 
be adopted os a starting point. The next stage was to choose a system 
upon which the strategy could be applied. The aspects which govern
system recovery under faulted conditions become more critical as the 
response time of the system decreases. With these factors in mind a 
decision was made to choose a real time system as opposed to a batch 
processing system since requirements for processing speed, critica lity  of 
system outputs and fault recovery time ore much more demanding.
1 .2 . Research M odel.
After careful consideration it was decided to base the study on a 
notional ground defence system, which consisted of a target tracking and 
missile guidance loop os described in Chapter 4 , in order to establish 
the objectives previously mentioned.
The target tracking process consists of converting raw target data 
into a plot of target positions. The raw target data is produced from a 
radar whose aerial rotates at a constant rate, and consists of range and 
velocity  data extracted from the returning radar signals.
The missile guidance loop consists of a proportional plus integral 
controller and the missile itself whose autopilot is represented by a 
second order function.
The tracking process determines the angular position of the target 
which is known os the target azimuth. This angle becomes the input for 
the guidance loop, whose objective is to constrain the missile to lie  
on a line joining the tracking system and the target.
The modelling of these functions in a microprocessor environment 
is described in Chapter 5 .
1 .3 . Systems Implementation and Investigation.
A  subset of the real time system was implemented on a single 
microprocessor to establish how well it was capable of detecting and 
recovering from faults within its system. The single microprocessor 
system carried out the function of the target tracking process with raw 
target data being provided from a PDF 11. The implementation of the 
target tracking process in a microprocessor system is described in Chapter 6, 
This system was then operated under fault conditions to provide a baseline
for the results. Following this a fault tolerant structure was implemented; 
the results obtained from this ore discussed in Chapter 7 . The conclusions 
of the single microprocessor study ore stated in Chapter 8.
Having gained valuable experience about the workings of the 
system under fault conditions, a distributed processing system was then 
investigated, this involved the choice of a communications link and the 
method for injecting real time faults onto the system; these topics are 
discussed in Chapter 9 , The implementation of the complete real time 
system in a distributed processing environment is described in Chapter 10, 
The study also involved looking at a three processor system with 
protection and recovery methods for increased ava ilab ility  under fault 
conditions, the results of which are given in Chapter 11.
The use of a standby processor system is shown to give continued 
systems operation under conditions which would normally cause a 
catastrophic crash in non-redundant systems.
Chapter 12 looks at the question of when should such a redundant 
processor subsystem be used and presents results for the recovery of the 
system from the failure of a complete subsystem. The conclusions of the 
distributed processing study con be found in Chapter 13. This is 
followed by a review of guidelines for reliable systems design and the 
in itia l design of a single microprocessor system within Chapter 14.
A final chapter reviews the achievements made from the research study.
Chapter 2 . Techniques for Reliable Systems Design.
The re liab ility  of microprocessor based systems can be improved by a 
combination of several strategies: fault avoidance, fault removal and fault
tolerance. The amount of work carried out in this area is considerable and 
this chapter summarises a number of techniques which ore directed at 
enhancing the re lia b ility  of a system. In addition the problem of 
re lia b ility  prediction for microprocessor based systems is considered.
2 .1 .  Failures, Errors and Faults .
2
To avoid ambiguity the terms failures, faults and errors are defined 
and are used throughout this thesis.
Failure.
A  failure o f a system occurs when the system does not perform its 
service in the manner specified. This may be either because it is unable to 
perform the service or because the system outputs ore not in accordance 
with the specifications. Thus a failure is an event.
Error.
An error is a port of an erroneous state which constitutes a . 
difference from a valid  state.
Faults.
A  fault is the mechanical or algorithmic cause of an error. This 
Encompasses areas of design inadequacies such as incorrect choice of 
component, system specification misinterpretation and incorrect inter­
relationship between system components (software and hardware),
2 .2 .  Fault Avoidance.
The in itia l stage of a development process is the functional 
specification stage; this generally involves determining the requirements 
for both normal and abnormal operation of the system. Design faults that 
can arise during this phase include inconsistent requirements and 
misinterpretation or omission of requirements. Design inadequacies made 
during the requirements definition phase which are found at a later stage 
generally involve a redesign of software and/or system and repeat of the testing
process. A reduction in the number of errors resulting could possibly be 
obtained by the introduction of formal system specification languages which 
serve as a communication aid between systems design, implementation 
and user. Research in this area is at an early stage; an exemple of a 
formal specification language can be found in R e f.3.
There exists a number of semigrophical methods for systems analysis. 
The most widely accepted of these methods is probably HIPO^ (Hierarchy, 
Input, Process and Output) whereby functional specification is created 
by naming the basic functions which hove to be performed and decomposing 
them into hierarchically ordered sub-functions. A  further technique is 
the Structured Analysis and Design Technique^. This is basically a 
diagramming language which is used to describe the relationship between 
objects and activ ities. The amount of detail shown in a single diagram is 
controlled and thus leads to diagrams which can be quickly understood by 
management and users.
A  technique gaining more acceptance is MASCOT^ which provides 
a formalism for expressing the software structure o f a real time system which 
can be independent of computer configuration and programming. It also 
provides a disciplined approach to design, implementation and testing 
of the system along with a strategy for documentation.
One of the most effective ways of avoiding design faults is to 
keep the complexity of systems design under control. Many software 
design methodologies based on this premise hove been developed.
They aim to structure software in a simple hierarchy of reasonably 
independent software modules. Work in this area includes reliable soft­
ware through composite design^ and the decomposition of systems into 
modules .
The use of small modules enables a complete understanding of their 
operation, in addition the consequence of modifications con be more 
easily seen than with one large program. Further, the use of structured 
programming leads to more reliable software and significantly improves
the readability and m aintainability of a module since structured code is 
read from top to bottom.
Consider now the hardware design; this is a task of selecting the 
most appropriate microprocessor and associated circuitry. A hardware/ 
software trade-off has to be mode, this is a matter of deciding which tasks 
are to be performed by software and which tasks by specialised hardware. 
Performing a task with specialised hardware incurs an extra cost in 
components and assembly for each product, whilst a software solution 
incurs a high development cost but has the advantage of non-recurring 
costs and ease of reconfiguration. A software solution to a problem w ill 
generally slow down the task execution unlike specialised hardware which 
can be designed to perform the task independently, for example a floating 
point arithmetic unit. Thus when difficulties arise in achieving the 
response time, then software should be replaced by hardware.
Systems design may be realised by a multi-processing solution 
since the processing power of a single microcomputer may be insufficient 
to meet the system requirements. In this cose the software would be 
partitioned into independent tasks, each being located in the relevant 
subsystem. The communications protocol used between subsystems would 
then be determined by consideration of distance of transfer, data integrity  
and response requirements.
In applications where highly reliable systems are required, an 
analysis of failure modes is usually carried out following the design.
. 9An example of a technique for failure analysis is Fault Tree Analysis, 
which starts by specifying a total system failure or safety critical failure. 
The analysis then proceeds downwards from this failure to identify part 
failure modes which could lead to such an overall fa ilu re. The final 
result is a highly detailed logic diagram depicting basic faults and events 
that can lead to the critical failure a t the top ot the diagram. Each basic 
fault is given a probability from on analytical or an empirical approach. 
The probability of the critical failure occurring is then calculated by
appropriate means from probabilities of the basic part failures. This 
technique is often applied in safety analysis, particularly in situations 
where human life  is a t risk or where cost of failure is prohibitive, or where 
certain system failure modes must be eliminated at the design stage.
The choice of programming language is another consideration of 
reducting the number o f design faults and several high level languages have 
been introduced to meet the demanding requirements of a real time system. 
The choice of a language is made by considering language facilities such 
as interrupt handling, I /O  facilities, program structure inherent in language 
implementation, data structure appropriate to application, portability  
and efficiency of execution of obj ect code. Examples of this are languages 
such as Coral and RTL/2, which have been specifically designed for real 
time applications, although Coral suffers from lack of I /O  fac ilities.
Pascal has a good structure and is portable, whilst Concurrent Pascal has 
specifically been designed for multi tasking environments. Ada is still very 
new and may be too complicated to be re liab le . In contrast PLM, PLZ and 
MPL have been specifically designed by Intel, Z ilog  and Motorola for their 
own chips and hence there is a lack of portability.
2 .3 .  Fault Removal .
Despite efforts to avoid faults in the analysis and design stages, 
system failures w ill still occur due to residual design faults. Fault removal 
techniques can be applied during the design phase in order to remove as 
many of these faults as possible consistent with cost, development time 
scale and re liab ility  requirements.
In the case of hardware many well proven techniques exist; 
these include design reviews, the building and testing of prototypes, 
inspection and testing of printed circuit boards and the use of component 
Burn-In to elim inate early failures.
The correctness of a systems design is important and must be checked 
before software coding is started. The use of structured walk throughs and 
design reviews are desirable where the correctness of each design step can
be checked by the designer and project engineers.
A  structured software system has the advantage that testing can be 
modular and more thorough thus removing a greater percentage of design faults. 
In top down testing, the top level is tested first, a lower segment is added 
and the combination tested. This is repeated down to the lowest leve l.
Dummy segments temporarily replace the segment subordinate to the segment 
under test. These dummy segments can vary in complexity and may return 
constants or may be a primitive version of the segment being simulated.
To enhance structured testing the length of a segment should be limited to a 
manageable leve l, say fifty  statements to enhance readability and 
comprehension whilst minimising page turning. Usually each segment w ill 
correspond to one function and can be implemented as a procedure with a 
descriptive name corresponding to the function. Thus the limited size of 
segment in addition to single en try /e x it, top to bottom flow of control 
makes programs easier to extend and maintain. R eliab ility  is further 
enhanced because test plans for the segment are easier to specify and execute.
Techniques for formal proving of program correctness^^'  ̂  ̂
are unlikely to replace program testing, now or in the near future since 
there are many problems still to be overcome. It seems reasonable to 
doubt the ab ility  of correctness proofs as it is d ifficu lt to write long programs 
without errors and program proving has so far been more d ifficu lt than the 
construction of programs. The solution may lie  in the use of computer aids 
to check the proof or generate it . The problem that then arises is how do 
you check the proof checker. In addition, large program proofs probably 
have to be constructed of small modules which could lead to an interfacing 
problem between modules. The correctness proof must also include areas 
such as processor and system architecture, memory size and timing 
considerations.
2 .4 .  Fault Tolerance.
Microprocessor based systems of the future are unlikely to be 
designed and built so as to be free from faults during their operational life .
Residual software design faults and random hardware faults are like ly  to occur; 
these must be detected, corrected and the system restored to a working state 
which leads to a need for built in redundancy for highly reliable systems 
operation. However, such redundancy must be applied carefully and in the 
correct structure, otherwise increased system hardware and software could 
lead to a reduction in re liab ility .
There are certain applications areas where use of fault tolerance 
is v ita l. First, there are systems where maintenance is not possible such 
as in space vehicles whilst reconfiguration around a malfunction may be 
possible. Secondly, fault tolerance is important in systems where human 
life  is at stake, for example control of nuclear plants, ground defence  
systems and transport systems. F inally , there are applications in which 
computer downtime leads to financial losses such as automated process 
control and communication systems.
Having discussed the need for fault tolerance, consider now the 
types of faults that may occur during the operational life  of the system.
2 .4 .1 .  Characterisation of Faults.
Faults occurring in a system may be attributed to a number of 
factors, e .g . temporary, intermittent or permanent failure of hardware 
components, hardware or software design faults or manufacturing faults.
A fault causes an error if an incorrect state is entered; the fault does not 
always cause an error to occur immediately, for example a memory cell 
having a stuck-at 'logical 1 ' fault w ill not cause an error until a 
'logical O' is incorrectly read as 'logical T ,
Temporary or transient faults are those of limited duration and 
can be caused by malfunctions of components or by the introduction of 
interference. If the duration of a transient fault is longer than a pre­
determined time then it w ill be interpreted as a permanent fault; for example 
a communications link may allow  up to three re-transmissions of data 
before a permanent fault is reported.
Consider next the permanent failures of components; if  the fault is
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not masked then it must be detected and recovery can then take place.
This may consist of a software algorithm for hardware reconfiguration along 
with program and data rollback.
Local faults can be described as those that only affect a single logic 
variable whereas distributed faults are those which affect two or more 
variables. The advent of LSI and VLSI chips means that distributed 
faults are much more like ly  to occur than in the past, as a single gate is 
unlikely to fail without affecting other gates in a complex closely packed 
integrated circuit. Distributed faults can also be caused by failure of a 
single critical element, for example processor clock or power supply.
2 .4 .2 .  Redundancy Techniques.
The detection of a fault during operational use is the starting point 
of a ll fault tolerant mechanisms except those which use fault masking.
In many systems it is important that these faults are detected quickly and 
are not allowed to propagate, otherwise system failure may occur.
In order to detect malfunctions the systems behaviour must be 
monitored in order to show deviations from the norm. This monitoring is 
generally performed by a combination of hardware and software techniques 
for detecting system malfunctions include the following:
(a) The pattern of states through which the system passes can be 
compared with expected or valid  state transition patterns in order to reveal 
the presence of hardware or software faults.
(b) The performance of the system can be monitored to indicate 
fau lt free operation; this monitoring includes response time, system 
throughput and process calculation time.
(c) A  malfunctioning system w ill often lead to the process trying 
to execute an invalid instruction or one that has an invalid address.
(d) The use of traps in processor software can be used to indicate, 
for example, division by zero or overflow conditions which may be caused 
by the propagation of a fault to the relevant instruction.
Hardware redundancy can be divided into two types, i . e .  masking
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and standby redundancy as described below. Redundancy in the form of 
software is considered in section 2 .4 .4 .
Fault masking is a technique w idely used, whereby the fault is masked 
by the presence of additional hardware, the output remaining error free 
as long as the protection is adequate. One form of fault masking is the 
use of n -  modular redundancy where majority voting takes place on the 
outputs of an odd number of identical units. The use of error correcting 
codes is another form of fault masking, the most common code being the 
Hamming code^^.
Standby redundancy can either be classed as cold or hot standby; 
the terms cold and hot relate to whether the redundant units are powered up. 
in cold standby redundancy, only one unit is powered up and operational, 
whilst the remaining units are not powered up. A  schematic of cold 
standby redundancy is shown in F ig .2 .1 .  A  failure sensing and switchover 
device monitors the operation of the working unit and switches to one of the 
standby units when a failure of the working unit is detected.
In a hot standby redundancy scheme, a ll units are powered up, and 
are arranged typ ically  as shown in F ig .2 .2 .  This figure shows three units 
with the output of one of the units, chosen arb itrarily , providing the system 
output. If the comparator detects a disagreement, then the faulty unit 
must be identified and the system output taken from one of the other units.
The time taken to switch from a faulty unit to a fau lt-free  unit must be 
considered in the design phase.
2 .4 .3 .  Fault Recovery.
The detection of a fault provides the basis for the next step which is 
the correction and recovery of the system. Fault masking is a special case 
of system recovery which does not use separate fault detection.
In systems where high a va ilab ility  is necessary, the recovery from 
a fault must be automatic and not require human intervention.
Methods of recovery from a fault include:
(a) Re-try the operation that fa iled , if  successful then continue.
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This is particularly valid in the presence of temporary faults.
(b) Rollback of system to a position where system operation was 
known to be correct and repeat execution.
(c) Reconstruct or correct data structures from redundant data 
or status information.
(d) R e-in itialise the system, with or without status information.
(e) Restore the system state to nominal or default values with 
the use of a status flag to indicate that output may contain inaccuracies.
(f) The use of standby spares either in a cold or a powered up 
condition.
System recovery can take one of three useful forms: full recovery, 
graceful degradation or safe shutdown. The techniques used in a 
particular system depend upon the extent of the damage, the possible 
cause of malfunction and the operating state of the system at the time of 
the fault.
2 .4 .4 .  Fault Tolerant Software.
The use of redundant elements is an established practice in fault 
tolerance of hardware. However, the use of redundant software for 
reliable operation requires special attention due to the nature of software, 
in contrast to hardware in which physical faults dominate, software defects 
are time invariant. Executing duplicate copies of a program in parallel 
does not improve the operation with respect to software defects, because 
software design faults w ill be inherent in both copies. The following 
paragraphs describe two methods of achieving fault tolerance in software:
N  -Version programming^^ and the Recovery Block^^.
2 .4 .4 .1 .  N-Version Programming.
This approach is analogous to the well known hardware method of 
replication and voting on the outputs of the hardware modules.
A  number (N  ]^2) of independently coded programs for a given process 
are run simultaneously on loosely coupled processors. The independent 
results are then compared, and in the case of a disagreement, a preferred
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result is generated by m ajority voting (for N  > 2) or by a predetermined 
strategy. The success of this technique depends upon the level of 
independence that can be achieved in the N  Versions of the program. 
Independence is best obtained by the use of different algorithms and 
programming languages in each version. Different data structures could 
also be used to increase the independence. The critical areas for this 
technique are the voting algorithm and the housekeeping prior to and 
after voting.
A constraint on N-Version programming is the requirement for 
N  computers that are hardware independent, yet are able to communicate 
effic ien tly . The problem of synchronising arises here, a voter may have 
to w ait for a result or indeed a result may never arrive due to a fault.
2 .4 .4 .2 .  The Recovery Block.
This technique, in contrast to N-Version programming, can be 
applied to any configuration of processors, including a single processor.
The structure in its simplest form is shown in F ig .2 .3 . ,  where a process 
is described by a primary routine P. The output of the primary routine must 
pass an acceptance test T before passing control to the next process, 
i f  the acceptance test fails or i f  a set time has expired whilst executing 
the primary routine then a transfer to the alternate routine, Q , is in itia ted . 
If  the acceptance test fails after execution of the routine Q  or if  a time 
out occurs during Q  then an error return results. This technique does 
not preclude the use of several alternate routines if  necessary for critical 
parts of the system.
It follows that a critical feature of the Recovery Block is the 
acceptance test. The alternate routines are worthless i f  failure of the 
primary routine is not detected by the acceptance test, thus the acceptance 
test must be thorough without being too time consuming.
A number of different types of acceptance tests are described in 
the following paragraphs:
(a) In many cases the definitions of the process imposes conditions
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which must be met at the completion of the process. These conditions 
can be used to construct the acceptance test. For example, an acceptance 
test for a sorting process may be to check the order, produced by the 
primary or alternate routines, is correct.
(b) Accounting checks can be used in acceptance tests for 
processes that are transaction oriented. The acceptance test could 
independently generate a checksum and compare it with the one produced 
by a primary or alternate routine.
(c) Another class of tests are called reasonableness tests.
These tests are based on precomputed ranges of variables, expected sequences 
of program states or other occurrences that might be expected to occur in 
the system. Reasonableness tests are based on physical constraints whereas 
tests for requirements are based on mathematical or logical relationships.
Tests used for acceptance can typically examine whether a variable is in 
range, whether the increment or decrement of a variable is in range or 
correlation between different variables is in range. For example, a process 
might calculate the acceleration of a missile. The acceptance test might 
simply test whether this acceleration is within predetermined limits, say 
-  lOg in order to maintain structural integrity.
(d) In an important process such as a firing sequence, the use of 
flags is a good way to ensure the correct procedure has been followed.
In such a case, the acceptance test could check to see if  a ll the 
appropriate flags have been set before firing is allowed to occur.
2 .5 .  Reliability  Modelling.
The re liab ility  of microprocessor based systems has conveniently 
been divided into two areas, i .e .  that of hardware and software, due to the 
two disciplines involved in the design. Hardware re lia b ility  modelling 
has been an established practise for many years whilst software 
re lia b ility  modelling has only made an appearance in the last ten years.
Consider first the modelling of software re lia b ility .
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2 .5 .1 .  Software Reliability  M odel!îng.
Software has the unique property that it suffers no natural 
degradation, except in the special case of software stored on magnetic 
media. The purpose of an error prediction model is largely as a 
management aid to decide when enough testing has taken place and in 
assessing the confidence levels that can be placed in the software.
Many models that have been put forward use a bug counting 
approach. This approach has been used by Jelinski and Moranda^^ and 
by Schooman^^. Jel inski and Moranda developed a software re liab ility  
model which assumes exponential distribution of faults and a software 
failure rate, i . e .  the rate at which the software system foils to meet in­
formal system requirements, which decreases in discrete steps as a function 
of tim e. Schooman's model is based on the same underlying assumptions 
with the difference that failure rate is also dependent upon the debugging 
effort. These models imply that re liab ility  improvement can only take 
place at a system failure, since it is only here that a design error can be 
removed.
Musa^^ presents another model, using program execution time as 
the time variable rather than calender or debugging time as in the 
previously mentioned models. In addition he introduces a factor for non­
corrections of the cause of the failure.
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Schick and Wolverton address the problem to a re liab ility  model 
by determining an analytic stochastic model for predicting the number of 
remaining errors in the software, the mean time to next fa ilure, the time 
to discover the remaining errors and the standard deviation associated 
with the error prediction.
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Littlewood and Verrai I use a contrasting approach of no news 
being good news, where failure rate decreases between failures and 
periods of failure free working cause the re liab ility  to improve.
Even if  assumptions about failure rates being proportional to the 
number of errors remaining are accepted, then estimation of model
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parameters still poses great d ifficu lty . One objective should be to measure 
the quality of the behaviour of the software, its operational re liab ility  
(integrity) rather than the number of design errors left in the program.
It is considered by the author that instead of establishing a figure 
for software re lia b ility , in terms of number of remaining errors, that a 
range of software metrics be used for assessment of software integrity.
This assessment must depend upon the compexity of the software modules, 
the critica lity  of each module to system performance, the tolerance of 
each module to errors caused by environmental factors and the maintain­
a b ility  and testability of the software.
Consider now the modelling of hardware re lia b ility .
2 .5 .2 .  Hardware Reliability  Modelling
The effects of environmental stressing are known as random failures. 
These failures occur in a ll types of electronic equipment and are generally 
treated as exhibiting a constant failure rate. This constant failure rate 
in non-redundant systems is supported by the use of life  test and field data, 
after accounting for infant mortalities and the effects of maintenance.
In microprocessor based systems, malfunctions are dependant upon 
the component configuration, for example a failure may result from a 
transistor sinking excess current. Thus a re lia b ility  model must take 
account of prevalent failure modes.
The laws of probability govern the outcome of a mission of a 
redundant system and simple probability formulae clearly show the 
advantage of redundancy. Consider a triple modular redundant (TMR) 
system where three identical computers are used to give an output based 
on a m ajority vote. This system w ill only give an improvement in the mean 
time to error if  maintenance is provided before the 'mean time before 
fa ilure' of the individual modules. TMR systems are vulnerable to voting 
and single point timing failures which reduce the re liab ility  of such 
systems.
Error detection and correction can be incorporated into integrated
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circuits to extend their 'mean time between failure' provided a 
comprehensive testing capability is also incorporated. An example of 
the design for testability of error correction circu itry  for memory arrays 
is given in R ef.20. However, the effectiveness of any on chip redundancy 
w ill always be limited by the high correlation between malfunctions and 
the common thermal and structural failures.
In a complex system, the relationship between a random failure and 
its manifestation as an error is apt to be obscured by ill defined propagation 
paths. This is like ly  to cause problems for analytic models based on 
simple cause -  effect relationships.
The modelling of some of the more complex redundant systems is often 
carried out by the use of Markov process models. These models can be made 
arbitrarily accurate by incorporating an arbitrary number of states.
Caution must be applied in using these models on processes other than 
those with constant failure and recovery rates. A  constant recovery 
rate is hard to imagine for a real time system as the time taken to recover 
depends upon configuration of the system at time of fau lt, the process 
being executed and the critica lity  of the fau lt.
A va ilab ility  is measured as the percentage of time that a system is in 
an operational state. In some applications, the penalty for a single long un- 
operational period is much greater than that for many short periods, whereas 
the ava ilab ility  figure may be equal for the two instances. In this case, 
another parameter is required to describe the performance, i .e .  time.
This concept of penalising a slow recovery is discussed in Chapter 1 1 .2 .
Coverage of a system is the probability of the system recovering from 
a malfunction, it is a complex architectural attribute and is influenced 
by latency of fau lt, ambiguity in the perception ot the fault and by the 
architectural anticipation of such a fault. An estimation of coverage 
made before experimental verification is like ly  to be largely inaccurate. 
Retrospective coverage can be obtained but cannot accurately reflect 
any system other than that for which it  was gathered.
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Chapter 3. Analysis of a single Microprocessor System.
Having discussed techniques for reliable systems design in 
Chapter 2 an approach had to be chosen that could be used for single or 
distributed processing systems. A  requirement of the research was that 
massive redundancy was to be avoided, if possible. The Recovery Block 
meets this requirement and in the view of the author was a good basis for 
further investigation, in itia lly  on a single microprocessor and then fina lly  
in a distributed processing environment.
in order to determine recovery mechanisms for a processor system 
under fault conditions, it became necessary to identify the effect of faults 
on system operation. An example of this identification is given here on 
a typical processor system consisting of CPU, RAM R O M , A /D  and D /A  
convertors along with the necessary interconnecting and buffering logic, 
as shown schematically in F ig .3 .1 .  The data bus transceivers, address 
and control buffers as shown in F ig .3 .1 .  are permanently enabled and the 
direction of the data bus transceivers defaults to drive away from the 
CPU except when reading memory.
The approach of identifying failure modes and their effects is a 
useful method of fault avoidance. As hazards are identified, software 
and hardware defences can be developed using fault tolerant or self 
checking techniques to reduce the probability of their occurrence once 
the system has been implemented.
In the following section, typical causes and effect of faults are 
given for the described system; in addition possible solutions are given 
for the purpose of system recovery.
3 .1 .  Cause and effect of Faults in a Typical Microprocessor System.
The following descriptions of causes and effects should be read 
with reference to F ig .3 .1 .  The list is not exhaustive, but sufficient to 
identify typical fault effects in the view of the author.
Cause Effect Possible Solutions








occurs resulting in CPU 
fetching data and/or 
instructions from wrong 
addresses.
Possible Solution 
A  time out can be used to 
indicate that the program 
sequence was not completed 
in time.
By monitoring of bus with 
other logic then it  may be 
possible to re-arrange 
addressing of system, i . e .  
move program and data to 
another part of memory.
3 . Reset failure. System fails to reset 
when required.
If reset fails then attempt 
to carry on processing.
4 . Read/write  
lin e .
If the line is stuck at 
logical ' T ,  that is 
always a read cycle, 
then CPU is always 
reading from memory and of the fau lt. 
I /O .  When attempting 
to write then bus conflict 
w ill occur with CPU and 
memory buffers driving 
against each other.
If the line is stuck at logical 
'O' then the system always 
sees a write cycle. When a 
CPU read cycle occurs then 
memory is loaded with garbage.
The effect of an undriven bus 
w ill inevitably result in in­
correct program execution.
A  time out w ill indicate 
that a fault has occurred. 
Monitoring logic could give 
information on the nature
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Cause Effect Possible Solutions
5 . Data bus If stuck at faults occur
transceivers, on the data bus, then bad 
data is read from or written 
to memory, if  a fault in 
the direction logic occurs 
with direction always 
towards the CPU then bus 
conflict w ill occur; when 
writing to memory no data 
w ill be stored. If a 
direction fault occurs with 
direction always to memory, 
then when reading from 
memory the CPU w ill read 
a bus which is not driven.
There is a possible 
detection of an undriven 
bus as the CPU w ill 
probably read all I's; 
alternatively the bus 
could be made to 
default to a particular 
instruction. A  conflict 
on the data bus w ill 
cause time-out or a trap 
due to attempted 
execution of invalid  
instruction.
6 . Memory 
fa ilure.
Incorrect instruction/data 
is read from memory.
The fault can be masked 
by automatic error detecting 
correcting codes,although 
CPU intervention or 
special logic may be needed 
to correct multiple faults.
7 . Address As address b it fa ilure, 
bus buffer.
See solu tion 2 .
No memory accesses can 
Clock fa ilu re, be made.
The duplication of 
address and control buffers 




9 . V alid  Memory If stuck a t logical 'T  fault
Address
Signal.
occurs then memory is 
accessed at wrong point in 
time or spurious addressing 
occurs. If stuck a t logical 
'O' fault occurs then memory 
is never accessed.
Possible Solution 
The effect is probably 
caught by a time out.
10. CPU. The effects of such a fault Repeated time-outs
are wide ranging and include may possibly occur but
stuck at faults on buses, CPU may not respond
invalid control signals and to them,
incorrect operations.
1 1 . Address 
Decode 
Logic.
If no outputs from the There is a possibility
address decode logic are of using self checking
enabled, then the CPU reads logic here, 
an undriven bus.
If one output from the address 
decode logic is enabled, but 
it is the incorrect output then 
incorrect addressing occurs.
If  two outputs are enabled then 
memory is corrupted on a write 
cycle, and a bus conflict 
occurs on a read cycle.
If  the address decode logic is not 
enabled then no memory accesses 
w ill occur. If however the logic 
is always enabled then accidental 






As for effect 4 .
Possible Solution 




Bus conflict w ill occur if  
the enable occurs at the 
wrong time.
Possible solutions in­
clude self checking or 
monitoring by adaptive 
logic.
14. Buffer for end 
of conversion 
of A /D  
convertor.
If the buffer is always 
enabled then bus conflict 
w ill occur. If the 
buffer is never enabled, 
then the CPU reads an 
undriven bus.
A  bus conflict w ill 
probably cause a time­
out in a program segment. 
If  the buffer is never 
enabled then CPU w ill 
believe that conversion 
is not finished. The 
CPU could w ait until 
conversion should have 
finished and then read 
the data. This data 
can then be compared 
with the last value to 
determine whether 
'end of conversion' 
has not appeared due 
to a buffer or an A /D  
convertor fau lt. If 
an A /D  convertor 
fau lt has occurred then 
set a flag and use 







The conversion may 
appear to have finished 
early .
Possible Solution 
When polling to look 
for 'end of conversion' 
then check that it 
appears when 
expected and not 
before.
The fault may be due 
to A /D  convertor; 
use another
convertor if  necessary.
16. Conversion If  accidental addressing 
command occurs then an extra
fau lt. conversion command may
be generated.
Hov/ever, the con­
version command may 
not be given due to 
logic fau lt.
If accidental 
addressing occurs then 
an extra conversion 
w ill probably not 
matter.
If  no conversion command 
given then 'end of 
conversion' may not 
be cleared. The out­
put of the A /D  convertor 
can be compared with  
last value; switch 
to alternative  




17. Data latch 
for D /A  
convertor.
Effect
If input or output lines 
of latch have stuck at 
type faults then in­
correct conversion w ill 
occur. If the latch is 
not clocked then the last 
value clocked w ill be 
converted. If the latch 
is operated a t the wrong 
point in time due to 
accidental addressing 
then an incorrect value 
w ill be converted.
Possible Solution 
The periodic connection 
of the D /A  convertor 
output to the A /D  convertor 
input could detect faults.
If incorrect conversion 
occurred then CPU w ill 
detect the difference.
If the latch is not working 
then the D /A  convertor 
output w ill remain at last 
latched value and this 
w ill be detected by the 
CPU. If  the latch is 
operated at wrong point 
in time then the D /A  con­
vertor output is neither 
correct (present) value 
nor last value and the 
CPU w ill detect this.
If the data bus is not 
stuck then an alternative  
D /A  convertor can be 
switched in .
3 .2 .  Discussion of Failure Mode Effects.
The effects listed in the previous section for the faults considered 
are generally quite severe and continued system operation is unlikely  
if  the faults are permanent. The most common of the effects appears 
to be incorrect addressing, leading to execution of the wrong 
instruction or use of the wrong data. The corruption of data within
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memory may occur even if  memory is error correcting, since correction 
can only take place on faults within memory cells and not on incorrect 
data given to the error correcting memory.
The effect of faults on the control lines is similar to the effect 
of faults directly on the address and data lines. For example, a fault on 
the address strobe line may result in the wrong address being read or 
written to. This effect is similar to corruption of an address line, and 
may result in the microprocessor's program counter being corrupted.
If  the faults are transient in nature, then the effects suggest that 
detection must include checking of data reasonableness, checking of 
address sequences and the use of the time domain for checking system 
operation. If permanent faults occur in a single microprocessor system, 
then continued system operation w ill not be possible in the majority of 
cases. Redundancy can be used to protect certain parts of the system, 
e .g . clock, memory and possibly the address decode logic.
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Qigpter 4 . Real Time Systems Description.
This chapter describes a small real time system to be used as a basis 
for investigation into fault tolerant techniques. The system is complex 
enough to model a real system, but is simple enough such that complexity 
does not hinder the objectives of investigating the possibility of 
increased system a v a ila b ility . It was with this view in mind that the 
following operating characteristics were chosen.
4 .1 .  Design O verv iew .
The system devised for the research investigation was a ground 
based target tracking and guidance process which selectively tracks a single 
target and determines whether the target is within missile coverage.
The system is shown diagram atically in F ig .4 .1 .  with an explanation of 
the component parts as follows.
The doppler radar consists of an aerial which rotates at a constant 
rate. The nature of this radar means that target information from a single 
rotation of the aerial is insufficient to determine whether the target is 
approaching or receding. The decision on whether a target is approaching 
or receding is made using intormation from successive scans of the aeria l.
In addition, the target tracking process determines whether the target is 
within missile coverage, i .e .  has a missile a high probability of reaching 
and hitting the said target.
An operator can interact with the target tracking process and enter 
the system into one of two modes, i . e .  search or track modes. The former 
mode of operation is used whilst waiting for a target detection.
The target tracking process constantly updates the azimuth on which 
a target lies; thus azimuth is referred to as The ta Beam in F ig .4 .1 .
In order that only one target is tracked, the system uses an inhibition  
mechanism whereby target detection is only considered within a window 
around the last detected target position.
The target angle (Theta Beam) is used as the input to the missile 
guidance loop; this loop is stabilised by a digital controller using
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proportional plus integral control with a phase advance network.
The digital controller generates an output proportional to  lateral 
acceleration (I a tax) demand which is transmitted to the missile, which 
in turn produces a lateral acceleration as a result of this guidance demand. 
The guidance loop is closed by a simple relationship between the 
acceleration and the missile angle. Consider first the target tracking 
process.
4 .2 .  Target Tracking.
This section describes the requirements of a target tracking process 
which processes target aircraft data and determines whether the target is 
within missile coverage. If a target is present on the same azimuth as the 
radar, which scans through 360° in one second, then it appears in a range/ 
velocity  channel. Target detection in a given channel defines the range 
and velocity limits within which the target lies. The detection of a 
target in a channel sets a pair of binaries; other binaries cannot become 
set until the original pair have been reset. An alarm is then set 
depending upon which pair of binaries has become set.
The azimuth and range at which a target is detected are used for 
inhibition purposes on subsequent scans and provide control for setting 
binaries. Due to the nature of the radar supplying target data, the system 
must decide whether the target is approaching or receding and use this 
information to determine whether the target is within missile coverage.
4 .2 .1 .  Target Data Input.
Data input to the system consists of six range and four velocity  
gates, giving a total of 24 channels. The range and velocity gates are 
combined by means of a matrix, shown in F ig .4 .2 .  Some of the gates 
are arranged not to give an alarm, these correspond to slowly approaching 
or fast receding targets at maximum range. The combination of range and 
velocity  gates which do not give an alarm are known as taboo channels 
and are shown diagramatically in F ig .4 .3 .
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4 .2 .2 .  Azimuth inhibit.
Following a target detection, the target position is stored in terms 
of azimuth,and range and velocity gates set. On subsequent scans a 
target w ill only be detected if  its azimuth position lies within -  24 degrees 
of the stored target azimuth, which moves with each target detection.
The azimuth inhibit persists for four scans after the last detected target.
The principle of the azimuth inhibit is shown in F ig .4 .4 .
4 .2 .3 .  Range Inhibit.
When a target is detected the target range is stored; on the two 
scans following this detection the system w ill only detect targets at the 
same range or within one range gate on either side of the stored target 
range.
4 .2 .4 .  Approach/Recede Identification.
The identification of the target as approaching or receding is carried 
out by examining range and velocity data from successive scans.
In search mode only one missed scan is allowable before the approach/ 
recede decision is restarted, whereas up to four missing scans are allowable  
in track mode. The decision is based on four criteria as follows:
1. New target detection
A new target is deemed to be approaching until a complete 
evaluation is completed.
2 . Crossing target detection.
A  crossing target is defined as a target whose component of
velocity towards the radar is close to zero.
3 . A  changing target range pattern .
A  target which has a rapidly changing range pattern is quickly  
identified as approaching or receding.
4 . Doppler derived criteria .
If a target remains within a given range gate for a number of 
scans then velocity  gate information is used for the approach/ 
recede assessment.
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The algorithms for each of these criteria are not described in this thesis.
4 .2 .5 .  Missile Coverage.
Following the approach/recede algorithm the system identifies 
whether a target being tracked is within missile coverage. An 'in cover' 
indication represents a high probability that a target can be successfully 
reached by a missile. The determination of the coverage is described 
below.
4 .2 .5 .1 .  Search Mode.
In search mode, 'out of cover' is indicated if the target is deemed 
to be receding and the angular rate appropriate to the alarmed range and 
velocity  gate is zero. Table 4 .1 .  shows the angular rate information for 
range and velocity gate combinations.
4 .2 .5 .  2 . Track Mode.
In track mode. Table 4 .1 .  is used to determine whether the target 
is in or out of missile coverage for the appropriate range and velocity  
gate combination. If the angular rate, calculated as below, is less 
than the value in lookup table, then 'in cover' is set, otherwise 
'out of cover' is set.
Angular Rate = 100 -(1 0  x Number of alarms on target) (4 .1 . )
Having described the target tracking process, now consider the missile 
guidance loop.
4 .3 .  Missile Guidance Loop.
The guidance loop used is a line of sight guidance loop where 
the missile is constrained to lie  as nearly as possible on the line joining 
the defence system and the target.
The position of target is identified by a scanning radar aerial which 
rotates once per second. The target tracking process described in the 
previous section provides the position of a single target. The azimuth 
position of the target being tracked is then used as the input to the missile 
guidance loop which is taken from R ef.22 as shown diagram atically in 
F ig .4 .5 .  This consists of a controller, missile autopilot and a double
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integrator for kinematic loop closure.
The controller consists of proportional plus integral control with
S€cs.
an integrating time constant of two ^ In addition a double phase advance 
network, giving a maximum phase advance of 6 2 .6 °  is used for loop 
stabilisation.
The missile autopilot is represented by dynamics defined by a natural 
-1 .frequency of 12 rads and a damping factor of 0 .6 .  The missile produces 
a lateral acceleration as a result of a guidance demand. Kinematic loop 
closure of the guidance loop from lateral acceleration to position results 
in 180° phase lag represented as a double integrator.
The Bode plot for this loop is shown in F ig .4 . 6 . giving a phase 
margin of 35° and a gain mcrgin of 10.5dBs. The step response of the 
analogue system is shown in F ig .4 .7 .  giving an overshoot of approximately 
55% .
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Chapter 5 . Modelling of Real Time System.
The system described in Chapter 4 consists of two distinct parts: 
the target identification process and the guidance loop. In order to 
model this system, it  became necessary to simulate a target being tracked 
by a radar. This chapter describes how the above processes were 
modelled in order to represent a realistic real time control system.
5 .1 .  Target Simulation.
Target simulation is performed by a program which was 
specifically w ritten for this study to run on the PDF 1 1 . The program 
is designed to handle multiple targets, but for the purpose of this 
study only a single target was considered. The target is characterised 
by a start co-ordinate (x, y , z ) , a heading co-ordinate (s, t, u) 
and a velocity; a straight line course is assumed between the two co­
ordinates. The range of the target from the tracking system, situated at
(0, 0 , 0) is given by equation (5 .1 . )  assuming the target is at 
ccrordinate (a, b, c)
Slant Range = (a^ +  b^ +  c ^ f   (5 .1 . )
The target is then tracked by a radar whose characteristics are given 
by:
Measurable Slant Range: 1 Km to 7 Km
Measurable Velocity: 50 m/s to 450 m/s.
A  complete revolution was in itia lly  divided into 30 equal segments.
If a target is seen in the aerial's beamwidth at a particular point in 
time then the appropriate range and velocity  gates are set.
Thus for each l/3 0 th  second the program gives an output of six range 
and four velocity gates, either set or unset as determined by the target 
position. Ten complete scans are simulated, representing ten seconds 
of target motion. This duration was chosen as this period of 
results of the target tracking process conveniently fills  the temporary 
storage available.
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The target chosen for the first part of the study has the following 
characteristics:
Start Position: 800 1500 200
Heading: -100 1400 190
Velocity: 400
The units for the start position and heading are metres whilst the 
velocity is in metres/second. This target was chosen as it represents 
a crossing target, i . e .  the target is lost by the radar for approximately 
two seconds due to the fact that after about five seconds from the 
start o f the run the target's component of velocity  towards the radar 
aerial is close to zero.
5 .2 .  Target Tracking Process.
The target tracking process consists of seven tasks interconnected 
as shown in F ig .5 .1 . ,  which is a top level diagram of an SADT 
(Structured Analysis and Design Technique) activ ity  model^.
The tasks are described briefly below followed by typical results of the 
process.
5 .2 .1 .  Read Routine.
The read routine reads range and velocity  data every l/3 0 th  
second. This data is precomputed by a simulation program and is 
stored in an area of microprocessor memory. If a target is detected, 
i . e .  i f  any gates are set then the appropriate range and velocity  
channel variables are set to the appropriate values and the ' target 
detected' flag is set. The radar azimuth position is updated when the 
read routine is entered and can take values from 0 to 29. A flow  
chart of this routine is shown in F ig .5 .2 .
5 .2 .2 .  Process Azimuth Inhibit.
On the four scans following a target detection, the system 
considers targets only within a given angle ( -  24°) of the last azimuth 
on which a target was detected. A flag , 'target azimuth valid* 
is used to signify if a target has been detected within the last four scans.
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A  flow chart of this routine is shown in F ig .5 .3 .
5 .2 .3 .  Process Range Inhibit.
On the two scans following a target detection, the system 
considers targets only within -  1 range gate of the gate set when the 
target was detected. If 'azimuth inhibit' is set at any time then 
'range inhibit' is also set. A flag 'target range valid ' is used to indicate 
if  a target has been detected within the last two scans.
If more than two missing scans occur then 'target range valid ' 
is set invalid awaiting a new target, or reappearance of an old target.
A  flow chart of this routine is shown in F ig .5 .4 .
5 .2 .4 .  Set Binaries.
The set binaries routine decides which pair of binaries (if  any) 
becomes set; only one pair of binaries can be set at any one time. 
Another pair of binaries cannot become set until a target appears in a 
range/velocity  channel and the 'range inhibit' is not present. The 
setting of new pair of binaries resets the old pair. A  flow chart of this 
routine is shown in F ig .5 .5 .
5 .2 .5 .  Process Binaries.
The routine determines if  the pair of binaries set are allowed to 
generate an alarm. This is performed by the use of a look up table of 
taboo channels.
Two types of alarm can be generated; internal and external.
The internal alarm is used for control of the approach/recede and 
coverage assessments whilst the external alarm is an indication to the 
operator. The external alarm is given to the operator only in search 
mode. A flew chart of this routine is shown in F ig .5 . 6 .
5 .2 .6 .  Approach/Recede Assessment.
The approach/recede algorithm in track mode is different from 
that performed in search mode, as previously described in Chapter 4 ,2 .4 .  
Before the algorithm is started several other variables are calculated, 
these include the number of scans at the same range, variations in range
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between successive scans and identification of crossing targets. A  flow  
chart of this routine is shown in F ig .5 .7 .
5 .2 .7 .  Coverage Assessment.
The coverage assessment is based upon a look up table which 
determines whether the target is in or out o f missile coverage. The entry 
within the table is identified by the particular range/velocity binary pair 
set and whether the target is deemed to be approaching or receding.
If no binaries are set then the previous coverage indication remains for 
four aerial scans or until a new pair of binaries become set when coverage 
is reassessed. A flow chart of this routine is shown in F ig .5 .8 .
5 .2 .8 .  Baseline Performance.
Using the target characteristics given in Chapter 4 . 1 . ,  the target 
tracking process was run for ten seconds to provide a baseline performance. 
F ig .5 .9 .  represents some of the outputs of the target tracking process.
An explanation of these graphs follows:
F ig .5 . 9(a) Azimuth Position. This represents the internal radar
azimuth position; the ramp up to 30 represents the rotation 
of the aerial through 30 sectors of 12 degrees each.
Target Detected. This is a flag used to inform the system 
that a target has been detected, i .e .  a combination of 
range and velocity  gates have been set. The absence of the 
flag at five seconds is due to the crossing target.
Target Azimuth. The target azimuth is a record of the current 
azimuth on which the target being tracked lies. This 
variable is used for azimuth inhibition if  'target azimuth 
valid ' is set. The target being tracked changes from 
appearing early in the aerial scan to late in the aerial scan 
as it moves from right to left across the sky.
F ig .5 .9(b) Range Inhibition. Information on the target is updated only
when range inhibition is not set. N o information on the targets 
range and velocity is updated during the period of crossing.
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Binaries Flag. This flag is used to identify whether the last 
stored pair of range/velocity binaries are valid . 
internal Alarm. This informs the system that a target has 
been detected within the last second. The alarm is set to 
zero at about five seconds due to the crossing target, 
although the system still remembers the target as up to four 
missing scans are allowed. The alarm is set again when 
the target reappears after approximately two seconds.
In Cover. This graph shows that the target being tracked 
is deemed to be within missile coverage.
5 .3 .  Missile Guidance Loop.
In order to implement the guidance loop on a microprocessor system, 
it became necessary to digitise the transfer function. From F ig .4 . 6 . a . ,  
it  can be seen that the analogue crossover frequency is 3 .4  rad.5 .
A  sampling frequency had to be chosen that was a compromise 
between a low sampling frequency resulting in aliasing and a high 
sampling frequency where inaccuracies occur due to fin ite word length.
The sampling frequency chosen was 30 Hz which conveniently ties in 
with the 30 sectors in 360° for the target tracking process. The guidance 
loop. F ig .5 .1 0 . was implemented on two microprocessors, one 
processor performing the digital controller process and the other 
simulating the missile autopilot. Thus in digitising the complete guidance 
loop it is necessary to include two zero-order hold circuits as shown in 
F ig .5 .1 0 .  Combining the missile autopilot with the kinematic loop 
closure, the guidance loop consists of two separate parts. Z  Transforms 
were used to digitise the two separate parts.
From F ig .5 .1 0 .
G  ( z ) = ( l  - 2 " ’ ) .Z  A .  10(S +  1 ) ( S + 1)(S +  0 . 5 ) \  ............. (5 .2 . )
' I s  S(S +  3 .16)(S  +  3 .1 6 ) I
and
G (z )= ( l  - z * ’ ) .z /  1. 144 \   (5.3.)
\  ^ S^($^ +  1 4 S + 1 4 4 ) /
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The transfer functions of the controller and the missile in terms 
of z is derived by taking partial fractions, and then Z  Transforms 
of the component parts, along with setting T = 1 /30  second.
A full derivation of G^(z) and G^(z) can be found in Appendix A .
This results in the following equations:
G ^ (z )=  10(1 -  2 .918785963z“ ’ +  2.839590856z"^...................... ..........( 5 .4 . )
_______________________ -  0.9207881866z
(1 -  2 .800048928z"’ +  2 .610092963z‘ ^
-  0.810044035z‘ ^)
and
G ^(z) = -0 .000903747z" ' +  0 .002798632z‘ ^.................................. ..........( 5 .5 . )
________________ -  0.002670325z~^ +  0 .0009156z~*
1 -  3 .500869446z"’ +  4 .628827977z '^
-  2.755048263z"^ +  0 .627089085z“ ^
Having derived Z  Transforms for each of the two parts of the system, it 
is necessary to transform these equations into difference equations so 
that they can be executed on a PDP 11 or a microprocessor.
5 .3 .1 .  Floating Point Arithm etic.
The guidance loop was in itia lly  modelled on a PDP 11 using floating  
point arithmetic with seven significant decimal figures. Floating point 
arithmetic was used to determine the best realisation of the Z Transform 
equations before proceeding to execute the difference equations on a 
microprocessor with integer arithm etic. Three realisations were used 
and these are described in the following paragraphs.
5 .3 .1 .1 .  Direct Realisation.
The first realisation used the Direct method for transferring the
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transfer functions in z into difference equations. Given that
U(z) = a^ +  a^z  ̂ +  a^z ^ +  a^z ^ ..........(5 .6 . )
E(z) Tj ZÔ : 3 "
1 + b Q Z  + b ^ z  +  b ^ z
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then by the Direct method
° 0 ^n ^ - 1  ° 2 ^n- 2  °3^ n -3
■ ‘’O^n-1 ■ ’’ l^ n -2  ■ ^ 2 ^ L -3  ........... ( 5 .7 , )
Inserting the coefficients of equation 5 .4 .  into equation 5 .7 .  gives
the following difference equation for the digital controller
U = 1 0 E  -  29.18785963E = 28.39590856E  ̂ -  9 .207881866E ^
n n n-1 n -2  n-3
+ 2.800048928U , -  2 .610092963U « +  0.810044035U _
" -2  . ." .- .^ .(5 .8 .)
Likewise inserting the coefficients of equation 5 .5 .  into equation 5 .7 .
gives the following difference equation for the missile
Y  = -  0.000903767U , +  0.002798632U ^ -  0.002670325U .
n n- 1  n- 2  n-o
+  0.0009156U , +  3 .500869446Y ^ -  4 .628827977Y «
n -4  n-2 n-2
+  2.755048263Y 0.627089085Y  . (5 9 )
n -3  n -4     ' ' /
The guidance loop step response for this realisation is shown in F ig .5 .1 1 .
and gives an overshoot of 61%  with a settling time of approximately
six seconds to within 1% of the final va lu e .
To ensure that the simulation was not conditionally stable, the
binary representation of the coefficients was carried out. This
representation is necessary for the realisation of the loop in integer
arithm etic.
The resolution was set such that the smallest number which could 
be represented was 2  ̂ \  The simulation was again run with a unit 
step input and the output is shown in F ig .5 .1 2 . This shows that the 
direct realisation of the guidance loop is unstable with a binary 
representation of the coefficients.
5 .3 .1 .2 .  Cascade Realisation.
The second approach was to use the Cascade method of realisation. 
In this method the transfer function is expressed as a product of simple 
block elements.
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U (z) = g^D (z). D^(z)   Dm(z)  (5 .1 0 .)
E(z) °   ̂ ^
where m is less than n, the order of the system; Oq is a constant.
The block elements consist of either first or second order elements.
Using this method, the guidance loop was divided into block elements
as shown in F ig .5 .1 3 . The response to a unit step input is shown in
F ig .5 .1 4 . and is similar to that of the direct realisation shown in F ig .5 .11
The binary representation of the coefficients using the cascade
realisation was carried out using the same resolution as above and this
gave a step response as shown in F ig .5 .1 5 . This shows slightly less
overshoot than for the realisation with exact coefficients (F ig .5 .1 4 . ) .
5 .3 .1 .3 .  Parallel Realisation.
Finally the Parallel method of realisation was used to simulate the
guidance loop. In this method, the transfer function is expressed as the
sum of parallel units which are either first or second order, i . e .
U (z) = Oq +  (z) +  D^(z) +  D j z )   (5 .1 1 .)
where m is less than n, the order of the system; Oq is a constant.
Using this method, the guidance loop was divided into elements as shown 
in F ig .5 .1 6 . Applying a unit step input, the output settles as shown in 
F ig .5 .1 7 . The response shown in F ig .5 .1 8 .  represents the same 
realisation, except that the coefficients have been binary rounded as 
above.
Under no fault conditions, the parallel and cascade structures 
give similar results, however under conditions of a fault in a basic 
elem ent, the cascade structure suffers from the fact that a fault is 
m ultiplied by each successive unit. The direct realisation was unstable 
with binary rounded coefficients and was le ft out of any further analysis.
5 .3 .2 .  Integer Arithm etic.
Having obtained stable results from both cascade and parallel 
realisations of the guidance loop, the next step was to perform the 
difference equations in integer arithmetic on a microprocessor.
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in itia lly  in 16 b it arithm etic. Using a unit step input the parallel 
realisation gave the output shown in F ig .5 .1 9 . and shows an overshoot less 
than 50%. hbwever when the error signal becomes small the output 
shows quantisation errors. The 16 bit cascade realisation, whose output 
for a unit step input is shown in F ig .5 .2 0 . ,  suffers from quantisation 
much more than the parallel realisation. The output is completely 
unsatisfactory and shows that this realisation has no practical use, and 
was therefore discarded.
In order to improve upon these results, the software for the two 
realisations was converted to perform 32 b it integer arithm etic.
To increase the sampling frequency at this stage would only have increased 
the quantisation due to a fin ite word length. Using the same input 
as before, both realisations (F ig .5 .2 1 . and 5 .2 2 . )  show improved 
responses which agree with that of the continuous system shown in 
F ig .4 .7 .
From the above results obtained, the parallel realisation of the 
guidance loop using 32 b it arithmetic was chosen as the 16 b it cascade 
realisation gave poor results and 'cascades' any error caused by hardware 
or software.
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Chapter 6,  Implementation.
The system used in this study to assess the effectiveness of 
redundant software and hardware for fault detection and recovery is 
based on a single Z8000 microprocessor. This processor was used 
throughout the research study and a description can be found in Appendix B. 
The Z8000 is connected to a Micromaster (Appendix C refers), via a serial 
link, which is in turn connected to a PDP 11 /34 . This chapter describes 
the hardware and software which was designed and completed for this 
study.
The software for the target tracking process is assembled on the 
PDP 11 and then transferred to the Micromaster before being loaded 
into the memory of the Z8000, as shown in the systems diagram in F ig .6 .1 .  
Assembler code was used in order to effectively monitor the effects of 
faults upon system execution.
The Micromaster acts as a terminal for the PDP 11 and controls flow
of programs and data to and from the Z8000 processor system, which is
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situated on an Am 96/4016 Evaluation Card . In order to inject 
faults onto the processor system, the processor buses are brought out from 
this card into an expansion box shown in photograph F ig .6 .2 .
The expansion box contains the manual switch arrangement for the 
injection of faults onto the processor bus, in addition to system memory 
and input/output. The memory and I /O  maps were designated as shown 
in F ig .6 .3 .  and 6 .4 . respectively.
6 .1 .  System M em ory.
The Evaluation card contains 8K bytes of dynamic RAM which is 
used to store the target data.
Memory organisation in the expansion box is such that any one RAM  
chip is assigned to only one b it of a word in memory so that a memory 
failure (either single cell or complete RAM) w II not cause more than one 
b it to be in error.
The error correcting memory, shown schematically in F ig .6 .5 .  is
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situated on two double Eurocards. The first card consists of the data 
memory, whilst the second consists of parity memory, error code 
generation and the error correction circuitry. The two circuit diagrams 
are shown in F ig .6 ,6 .  and 6 .7 .  respectively, whilst the layout diagrams 
and parts list are shown in Figs 6 .8 .  and 6 .9 .  and Tables 6 .1 .  and 6 .2 .
The operation of the error correcting memory is briefly described 
for both the read and write conditions as follows. Consider the operation 
of writing to memory. The data word is written directly into the data 
memory whilst the parity bits are generated from the data bits by a set of 
parity equations and are written into parity memory.
On a read operation, the data word is read from memory along 
with the associated parity bits. Parity is then regenerated from the data 
word. If an error has occurred in a memory cell that is being read, one 
or several of the parity bits w ill be in error. The parity bits are then 
decoded to determine which data b it is in error. The erroneous data b it is 
then corrected by the exclusive OR operation and is buffered onto the data 
bus by an inverting buffer. Note that the exclusive OR operation inverts 
all bits except the bit in error ( if  any). The correct polarity is restored 
by the use of the inverting buffers, as shown in F ig .6 .5 .
6 .2 .  System Input/O utput.
System inputs can be divided into two types, firstly target data which 
is produced on the PDP 11 and down loaded via the Micromaster.
Secondly inputs are provided in the form of switches on the front panel 
of the expansion box; these inputs represent the mode of operation of the 
tracking system and a system cancel fa c ility . System outputs are in the 
form of LED's and consist of an operator alarm, an error signal and 
indications to inform the operator that a target being tracked is within  
missile coverage. The circuit diagram layout diagram and parts list of the 
input/output card are shown in Figs.6 .1 0 . and 6 .1 1 . and Table 6 .3 .
The expansion box also houses a buffer card which buffers all 
signals from the Z8000. The circuit diagram^ layout diagram and parts
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list of this card are shown in Figs. 6 .1 2 . and 6 .1 3 . and Table 6 .4 .
6 .3 .  System Software.
The system incorporates a suite of programs which are required 
for the various tasks involved; these being shown diagramatically in 
F ig .6 .1 4 . With the exception of the PDP 11 graphics and plotting 
routines this software was developed by the author for this study.
The software is explained by means of following a typical run to generate 
ten seconds of system results. A  flow diagram of the software is shown 
in F ig .6 .1 5 .
In itia lly  fault data is produced by generating exponentially  
distributed fault interval times and uniformly distributed faults across the 
address and data bus.
Following this, the target data is generated by the target simulation 
program described in Chapter 5 .1 .  A  Z8000 cross assembler was written  
to generate assembly code listings and object code files for the target 
tracking process. The cross assembler runs on a PDP 11 and is described in 
detail in Appendix D. The object code file  produced, approximately 
3K bytes in size for the target tracking process, is transferred first to 
the Micromaster and then loaded into memory in the expansion box.
The target data takes the same path to the Z8000 system and resides in the 
memory on the Evaluation Card.
The target tracking process, described in Chapter 5 .2 .  is then run by 
commands to the Z8000 monitor via the Micromaster Keyboard. The 
injection of faults is carried out during the operation of this software and 
is described in the next section. Results are periodically sent from the 
Z8000 to the Micromaster and are stored there until the end ot the ten second 
run, when they are transferred to the PDP 11 and written into a disk f ile .
The disk file  contains blocks of data which can then be sorted in a form ready 
for the plotting routines. F ig .5 .9 .  shows a typical set of graphs 
produced in this manner.
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6 .4 . Fault Infection.
Two alternatives existed for the injection of faults; these are 
as follows:-
(a) Injection of faults within each of the memory and I /O  
devices connected to the buses
or
(b) Injection of faults directly in the buses which are common to 
all memory and I /O  devices.
The second of these alternatives was chosen as it simplified the circuitry  
required together with providing greater f le x ib ility .
Implementation of the fault injection logic was achieved by 
intercepting the buses by a logic and switching c ircuit. This 
arrangement allowed up to two bits of each of the address and data buses to 
be injected with faults at any one time. The faults can be stuck at 
logical 'O' (s -a -0 ), stuck at logical 'T  (s -a -1 ) or open circuit.
Two timers were used so that faults injected onto the data bus could be of 
different length to those on the address bus, and to ensure that faults 
are injected onto the respective buses at the appropriate time in the cycle. 
The design of logic to in ject faults with the previously mentioned properties 
is described in the following section.
6 .4 .1 .  Design of Fault Injection Logic.
Consider the design of fault injection logic for the single direction 
address bus. The requirement for the logic was that the output be:
1 . As input
2 . s -a -0
3 . s-a-1
4 . Open circuit
The selection and injection of these conditions is shown diagram atically in 
F ig .6 .1 6 . ,  where for simplicity of presentation a single pole switch selects 
either a fault or no fault condition. Consider in itia lly  the first three 
requirements listed above, for the purposes of design let A  be the input
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of the block (see Fig. 6 .1 6 .)  and Z be the output of the block.
The fault control consists of two inputs, one to decide if  a fault is to be 
applied (to be known as X ) and the other to decide whether the fault is 
stuck at logical 'O' or '1 ' (referred to as Y ) .
The control input is defined as: X a t logical 'O' -  No fault
X at logical '1 ' -  Inject fault
The type of fault injected is determined by the condition of the Y  input
which is defined as: Y  a t logical 'O' -  s -a -0  fault
Y  at logical '1 ' -  s-a-1 fault
Constructing a truth table it  follows that the output of the block is given 
by: Z  = AX + AY +  XY
. .... (6.1.)
Since three input OR gates are not ava ilab le , the equation 6 .1 .  was 
rewritten using De Morgans law to give:
Z = A X .  Â Ÿ .  (6 .2 . )
which can be implemented as shown in F ig .6 .1 7 .
The output Z  can then be optionally open circuit by adding a tri-state  
bus driver. Circuitry providing the control input (X ), the condition 
input (Y) and the tri-state buffer driver (disable) is shown in F ig .6 .1 8 .
Two of the above circuits were bu ilt so that up to two faults can be 
injected onto the systems address bus. The two lines which are injected 
with faults are switch selectable; the switching arrangement is shown in 
F ig .6 .1 9 . which also shows the switching for the data lines. The switches 
are shown in a position representing a typical fault injection path.
Since the data bus is bi-directional it  required more logic to 
implement fault injection compared with the address bus. This was 
accomplished by using two of the circuits shown in F ig .6 .1 7 . ,  back to 
back with a direction select (READ/WRITE) as shown in F ig .6 .2 0 .
A  wait state is used to extend the memory access, as the circuitry  
described above incurred a delay of approximately 40 nanoseconds.
The length of the applied faults is adjustable, via potentiometers on the
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expansion box front panel, between approximately 100 nanoseconds and 
1000 nanoseconds; although this does not preclude the possibility of 
leaving the fault on for any number o f instructions. The length of the 
open circuit fault is not adjustable and was fixed on a per instruction 
basis; this was thought to be a flexible enough arrangement.
The fault injection logic is mounted behind the front panel on the 
expansion box close to the fault selection switches, as shown in photograph 
F ig .6 .2 1 . The circuit diagram, layout diagram and parts list can be 
found in Figs 6 .2 2 . and 6 .2 3  and Table 6 .5 .
6 .4 .2 .  Method of Fault Injection.
The procedure for the injection of faults onto the processor system 
is as follows: the system is run for X instructions where X is an exponentially 
distributed variable. This type of distribution was used as it is typical 
in re liab ility  studies. The system then halts and the fault is set up on the 
front panel; the fault being introduced onto the processor bus when a single 
step command is given. Although the system is not run at full speed, it 
was time scaled to ensure that recovery from a fault takes place within a 
given tim e . When the fault has been injected, the system is run for 
another Y  instructions, where Y  is another exponentially distributed variable  
with the same mean as above. It was decided that 90%  of the faults should 
be of s -a -0  or s-a-1 type, with the remaining 10% being open circuit faults. 
A  uniform distribution was used to determine which b it of the address bus 
or the data bus was to be faulted.
6 .5 .  System Integration and Test.
In conclusion to the chapter, system integration and testing was 
carried out to establish that the design requirements had been satisfied.
These tests were extensive and consisted of procedures specially developed, 
but which have not been included in this thesis.
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Chapter 7 . Design Strategies: Single Processor System.
This chapter presents strategies for detection and recovery from 
transient hardware faults, their implementation on a single microprocessor 
system and their performance under extreme operating conditions.
The approach taken here was in itia lly  to in ject faults on the target tracking 
system with no recovery mechanisms to provide a baseline for the results. 
Having obtained a baseline, the next step was to use the basic Block 
Recovery structure and then build upon that structure to provide a recovery 
mechanism for a greater proportion of faults.
The software described in this chapter was stored in RAM as this 
gives less protection against faults than if  the software were held in ROM; 
thus results obtained are worst case, since program memory is not write 
protected.
It was decided that a system run should last ten seconds, as 
previously explained and that during this time a large number of faults 
would be injected in order to keep down the number of runs. It was 
decided that the interval between faults be exponentially distributed such 
that the mean number of faults that were injected was thirty.
7 .1 .  System with No Recovery.
In order to obtain a baseline set of results, the system was in itia lly  
operated without any recovery or protection software or hardware.
The criteria for improved systems ava ilab ility  taken here was the 
percentage of runs that successfully complete ten seconds of operation, 
to produce valid  outputs at the end of that time.
A total of twenty runs were carried out, of which only one was 
successfully completed. A further four runs completed the ten seconds, but 
did not give correct outputs during that time. Without any protection, 
system variables were often corrupted due to faults injected and these faults 
were allowed to propagate unchecked. Once a variable has been corrupted 
then, due to  the lack of acceptance testing,it is passed onto the next 
process which w ill also give incorrect outputs.
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The most surprising effect of faults was that only a minority caused 
the program counter to be badly corrupted immediately following the fault 
contrary to in tu ition. Given that the program counter was at address X  
before fau lt, then the effect of the m ajority of the faults was to leave 
the program counter within the range X -  256 bytes. This is due to the 
small percentage of the total instruction set that allow  a large deviation  
from the present program counter. Instructions that allow  this large 
deviation include jump to absolute address, call subroutine with absolute 
address and reload program counter from memory. The consequence of 
the program counter generally staying local immediately following a 
fault is that it is not necessary to separate primary and alternate routine 
software into separate blocks of memory with the provision of enabling 
and disabling memory, but that it is sufficient to separate the two routines 
by a trap area of 256 bytes.
Typically  a fault can lead to execution of wrong instructions, due 
to either an address or data fau lt. A fter one of these instructions the 
program counter is often set to a non-instruction word boundary.
This then leads to corruption of register contents or a misinterpretation 
of instruction. Although the fault may only have occurred for the 
duration of a single instruction, an instruction word boundary may not 
be reached for several instructions.
7 .2 .  Basic Recovery Block.
Having established the baseline, the next step was to implement 
the Recovery Block on the target tracking software. For each process, 
an acceptance test and an alternate routine was devised for checking and 
standby purposes. A  brief description of this software can be found in 
Appendix E. The acceptance tests used here were fa irly  simple consisting 
typ ically  of checking that variables were in range and checking that certain 
flags were set before generating an output to the system operator. The 
alternate routines ranged from re-entry of primary routine, setting a variable  
or variables to default values through to a less accurate method cf the
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primary routine, for example the alternate routine for range inhibit 
does not take into account the range at which the target is detected.
The overhead in software, caused by the use of a Recovery Block structure 
depends upon the extensiveness of the acceptance tests and the alternate  
routines structured within the system software; a typical value resulting from 
this study was 30 -  40% , The run time overhead depends upon how often 
the alternative routines are entered, this was found to be in the region 
of 15 -  20%  under the operating conditions of thirty faults (mean) in 
ten seconds.
The approach of using acceptance tests to flag errors and then using 
the alternate routines to correct them was avoided, as this quickly leads to 
a large collection of flags which have to be set, reset and read.
This could result in a situation where no error flags are set or reset.
The approach taken was to use the acceptance test to flag an error 
in the corresponding primary routine as complete failure of the routine and 
in itia te  transfer of control to an alternate routine. The assumption made 
was that i f  an error was found by the acceptance test then all values 
generated by the appropriate primary routine were judged to be in error 
and were regenerated or set to a predefined value.
7 .2 .1 .  integrity of D ata.
In order to maintain the integrity of the data base, each variable  
is only updated in memory after it has been confirmed to be correct.
At the beginning of each process the required variables are read into the 
CPU registers after which the CPU performs the particular process.
O nly  after the acceptance test passes are the updated variables written  
into memory. This is for two reasons; first, register transfers were 
considered to be more reliable than memory to register transfers during 
the process and so were kept to a minimum. Secondly, if the acceptance 
test foils, a correct copy of the variables is available in memory. The 
concept of using registers during the process rather than reading the 
variables from memory is not such a constraint as one might first think
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as many assemblers allow the user to give registers labels a t assembly time. 
Thus during the process the variable can be given a meaningful label rather 
than say R6.
7 .2 .2 .  Design Discipline.
The immediate implications of the Recovery Block technique imposes 
an additional element of discipline upon the designer in that he has to 
divide the total system task into subtasks each of which has an identifiable  
function which is amenable to acceptance testing. This forces him to 
think about the total system design and by virtue of packaging into sub tasks 
introduces some element of structure into the program. The sub tasks are 
each associated with a block of code corresponding to a Recovery Block of 
the form shown in F ig .2 .3 .  These can be linked together to perform a 
complete software task in a three level system shown in F ig .7 . i .
The first level is task direction and points to tasks to be performed in their 
proper sequence. Level 2 has the format of the Recovery Block for each 
task, and level 3 contains the coding for each primary alternate and 
acceptance test routine.
Note that the use of a Recovery Block structure does not preclude 
the use of defensive programming techniques, often known as Exception 
Handling^.
7 .2 .3 .  System Performance.
Using the above three level structure a total of 14 runs were carried 
out, each of 300 system cycles. O f  thes^ five runs were successfully 
completed with a further one run failing safe during the ten seconds.
This still left a total of eight runs which failed to complete due mainly to 
the processor trampling through memory.
As previously stated five runs successfully completed the ten seconds, 
all of these had at least one entry into an alternate routine which prevented 
the propagation of the original fau lt. A further two runs had an entry into 
an alternate routine during the ten seconds but 'crashed' before the ten 
seconds was completed.
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The Recovery Block was found to be capable of coping with data 
type faults where corruption of data occurs but incapable of dealing with 
system crashes which may occur due to execution of unimplemented 
opcode, or execution of unidentified instruction (where operation is 
uncertain) or by trampling through memory.
7 .3 .  Addition of Watchdog Timer.
The use of the basic Recovery Block as used in the previous section 
often led to a total loss of function. This loss of function was not 
flagged by the acceptance test as the test was often not entered under 
fault conditions. To overcome this the simple expedient of a hardware 
timer was introduced. On entry to level 2 in the software structure, the 
timer in the form of a free running counter is loaded with a process time 
number which is directly proportional to the expected completion time of 
the process. The task is then in itia ted , a successful exit from the primary 
routine leading to a reset of the counter. If  the primary routine does not 
exit in a predetermined time ( i .e .  the value loaded at the beginning of 
the process) then the counter goes through zero and triggers a system 
interrupt, this concept is shown schematically in F ig .7 .2 .
7 .3 .1 .  Recovery Using a Watchdog Tim er.
Although it  is fa irly  easy to time out a process due to a fa ilure, 
the next problem is to return the system to either the alternate routine 
of the same process or in itiate  a safe shutdown of the system. Once the 
interrupt routine has been entered it is not possible to use the program 
counter contents immediately before the interrupt as a guide to the last 
segment being processed.
In order for the interrupt service routine to determine the interrupted 
process, the appropriate process number is loaded into a RM^ location at 
the beginning of each primary and alternate routine. A  lookup table 
can then be used to determine the setting of the program counter which is 
then loaded to transfer to alternate or fail safe routine, depending upon 
which routine (primary or alternate) was being processed.
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It is possible that if a fault occurs then the task number may be 
corrupted. To overcome this, the integrity of the recovery mechanism was 
improved by use of a simple check on the process number to determine 
whether it is within a predetermined range. If it is found to be out of 
range then a fail safe routine can be entered. A flow chart of the 
recovery interrupt service routine is shown in F ig .7 .3 .
7 .3 .2 .  System Performance.
The target tracking system, with the watchdog timer was run for a 
total of fourteen times. O f  the fourteen runs, nine successfully completed 
the 300 system cycles with valid  outputs, with a further three runs failing  
safe during this period. This left two runs which failed to complete with 
valid outputs, due either to a system crash or data corruption.
The proportion of runs that completed ten seconds was significantly  
improved over the basic Recovery Block. This was due to the system 
recognising that under fault conditions some processes failed to complete 
within a predetermined time lim it. An analysis of the two runs that 
failed to finish shows that the first would have been able to recover from a 
particular fault i f  the unimplemented instruction trap had been used.
The second run failed to finish as the timer had not been started when the 
fault occurred and the fault led the program counter to be set into memory 
that was not present, and thus recovery never occurred.
7 .3 .3 .  Summary.
The results obtained for the watchdog timer are encouraging when 
compared with the strategies so far examined, as summarised below.
(a) No Recovery System -  5%  of runs successfully completed.
(b) Basic Block Recovery -  35%  of runs successfully completed
7%  of runs failed safe
(c) Block Recovery with Watchdog Timer
64%  of runs successfully completed
21 % of runs failed safe.
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7 .4 .  Typical Fault Effects.
As a result of injecting hundreds of faults on a microprocessor 
system, there emerged a number of different fault effects. Before 
proceeding to further protection and recovery mechanisms, these fault 
effects are briefly discussed below:
(a) Execution of Wrong Instruction.
An address fault led to execution of instruction at location other 
than program counter. Following this instruction the program counter 
was set to a non-instruction word boundary. When fault removed next 
instruction was an address which corresponded to an instruction for a 
software interrupt.
(b) Condition Code Error.
A data fault led to a conditional jump based on the wrong condition
code.
(c) Opcode Error.
A data fault completely changed meaning of instruction. Instead 
of loading a register from memory, a different memory location was 
cleared.
(d) Offset Error in Jump.
A data fault led to a relative jump made to wrong address due to 
incorrect reading of offset in instruction.
(e) Execution of Wrong Instruction.
An address fault led to execution of instruction at location other 
than program counter. This instruction (actually an address) led to a 
reloading of program counter and status register, leading to system crash.
(f) Recovery Block Error.
With the basic Recovery Block, a fault at the end of the primary 
routine caused the processor to miss the return from subroutine instruction. 
The processor carried out through the acceptance test, following the 
primary routine, until it encountered a return instruction which caused 
a return to the instruction following the call to primary routine which was
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call acceptance test. This acceptance test actually performed twice 
on primary routine outputs.
(g) Memory Read Error.
A  fault occurred during reading of variables from memory into 
registers; the registers were left as they were from previous process. 
Acceptance test failed and recovery occurred by alternate routine which 
correctly read variables, performed process and passed acceptance test.
(h) Acceptance Test Failure.
After returning successfully from acceptance test, a fault occurred 
when acceptance test error flag was being checked, the program counter 
was updated and entry into alternate routine occurred.
(i) Execution of Wrong Instruction.
A  fault led to execution of wrong instruction, the program counter 
was set to a non instruction word boundary and the next instruction was an 
unimplemented instruction. A trap occurred whose vector had not been 
set and a system crash followed.
([) Acceptance Test Failure.
A fault occurred within the acceptance test which led to its failure  
on good data.
(k) Memory Read Error.
A  register was loaded from an incorrect memory address due to a data
fault.
( I)  Execution of Wrong Instructions .
A  register was loaded from memory a t wrong point in program due 
to execution of wrong instruction due to address fault.
(m) Program Corruption.
A  corruption of a program location led to an unimplemented 
instruction trap.
(n) System Data Corruption.
A safe shutdown on the system occurred when primary and alternate
routines both failed acceptance test. During execution of primary routine a
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variable was corrupted in memory and incorrect outputs were given.
The alternate routine was to perform primary routine again when incorrect 
results were also given. This highlights the care necessary when using 
a repeat of primary routine as the alternate routine.
(o) Subroutine Call Error
A  situation occurred where timer was of no use for recovery.
A fault occurred a t level 2, i . e .  CALL PRIMARY, instead of a primary 
routine being called a subroutine was called whose address was in 
memory which was not implemented. The timer was set running as 
primary routine was never entered.
(p) Execution of Wrong Instructions
A fault occurred at the end of a primary routine on instructions to 
reset timer, time out occurred soon after and alternate routine was 
successfully entered.
(q) Timer Reset Fault
As a precaution to the above effect, the timer was reset at the 
beginning and end of every primary routine. A  situation arose where, 
due to a fault the timer was not reset at the beginning of a primary 
although the task time was loaded and the timer set running. However, 
there was no ill effect of the missed timer reset as it would 
have been reset at the end of the preceding process.
7 .5 . Further Additions to Recovery .
The use of the watchdog timer provided system recovery in 85% of 
the runs carried out. In order to improve system recovery coverage it 
is necessary to  look at additional facilities which are discussed in the 
following paragraphs.
7 .5 .1 .  Use of Unimplemented Instruction Trap.
One of the runs with the watchdog timer, as summarised in 
Section 7 .3 .3 .  showed that the unimplemented instruction trap 
can be used for recovery purposes. The Z8000 has a built in 
unimplemented instruction trap and this can be used for recovery if  the
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vector is set equal to that of the interrupt for the hardware timer.
Thus if  either an interrupt due to timeout or an unimplemented instruction 
trap occurs then the same recovery mechanism w ill be used, as previously 
described. The run which failed due to this fa c ility  not being used was 
carried out again with its vector set and with the same faults injected, 
resulting in a successful completion.
O n ly  some microprocessors have this built in fac ility  for detecting 
unimplemented instructions, though this fa c ility  can usually be added by 
the addition of external hardware. For example, the Texas 9900 which 
has about 2%  of its opcode fie ld  as unimplemented can use external 
hardware as given in Ref. 25.
In addition most processors have a software interrupt fa c ility .
If this is not required by the system software then the software interrupt 
vector should be set equal to that of the hardware timer, so that an 
unexpected software interrupt due to a fault w ill not cause a system crash.
7 .5 .2 .  Default Data Bus.
In most real time systems there are areas of the memory map that are 
not filled  by memory devices. Thus if  the program counter is inadvertantly 
set somewhere w ithin this unimplemented area then during a read operation 
the data bus w ill be floating. This can be made use of by attaching 
resistors onto the data bus, in the form of pull up and pull down resistors, 
so that the data bus defaults to an instruction such as software interrupt 
when not driven. This is shown by example in F ig .7 .4 .  for a 4 b it data 
bus where a software interrupt is represented by 1100 (binary).
The resistors should be of sufficiently high value in order to prevent 
excessive current drain. During normal operation the bus w ill be driven 
high and low as required by CPU and memory devices. The first 
instruction that the processor executes after jumping into unimplemented 
memory is a software interrupt whose vector is set equal to that of the 
timer and thus initiates a recovery. This mechanism provides an earlier 
fault indication than the watchdog timer in the situation of the processor
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jumping into unimplemented area, although the timer is still invaluable  
for recovery if  the processor executes an incorrect section of code.
In addition this mechanism provides a fault indication if  the processor 
jumps into an unimplemented area of memory before the timer is started.
7 .5 .3 .  Trap Area .
It was found that on many occasions, due to faults, that the return 
statement at the end of a process was missed and the processor continued 
into the next section of code. In this situation recovery would still take 
place by watchdog timer or by execution of an unimplemented instruction. 
However to speed recovery and to reduce still further any inadvertant 
action, a trap area can be used after each return statement, i . e .  between 
each process. This trap area, shown schematically in F ig .7 .5 . ,  would 
consist of a gap equal to the maximum length opcode in words of the 
processor. This trap area would consist of software interrupt instructions 
whose vector was set equal to the timer recovery procedure. Thus i f  a 
return was missed due to a fault then a software interrupt would occur 
and recovery take place.
7 .5 .4 .  Performance Counter.
It has been shown that with certain additions to the Recovery Block, 
it  is possible in a single microprocessor system to recover from a ll ,  as 
far as can be seen, transient hardware faults. However, in many real time 
systems it is not sufficient to use an alternate routine cycle after cycle 
in the case of a prolonged fault or software design error as degraded 
performance may only be acceptable for a lim ited period of time before 
a different system strategy is required. This is almost certainly true in 
a situation with recursive calculation where an alternate routine may use 
last value or a default value. Thus it is suggested here that in many 
applications a counter be used within the alternate routine to count 
consecutive or total entries into the routine. If the count is exceeded 
then another alternate, for example use of another sensor, or fail 
safe routine can be entered.
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7 .6 .  Extensions to the Recovery Block
This section summarises the possible extensions mode by the 
author, the majority of which have been implemented.
(a) An unimplemented instruction trap can be used to speed 
response to faults. This trap is internally implemented on processors 
such as the Z8000, 68000 and can be readily implemented in hardware 
on others such as the TMS 9900.
(b) A timer can be used to ensure that primary and alternate  
routines do not take longer than expected to execute or finish before
a minimum time.
(c) A  set number of automatic retries can be used before 
classifying the fault as permanent or transient.
(d) The use of pull up and pull down resistors to provide 
recovery when program counter is set into an unimplemented memory 
area.
(e) For system critical variables, it may be re cessary to keep 
a copy in both memory and allocated register within CPU. This can 
obviously only be used for one or two variables.
(f) In some instances it may not be possible to perform the 
acceptance test on the alternate routine due to time constraints.
(g) In some instances it is not advisable to carry out an 
acceptance test on the alternate routine, i f  the size of the routine is 
less than that o f the acceptance test.
(h) A  count may be necessary within the alternate routine as 
degraded system performance may only be acceptable for a limited period 
of time.
(i)  A  trap area can be used between processes to eliminate the 
possibility of inadvertantly going from one process to another through 
omission of a return.
A  more generalised form of the Recovery Block can be found in 
F ig .7 .6 . which covers some of the points mentioned above, which are
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not covered by the basic Recovery Block. In this figure block A  is 
general, the output of A  may be to P or Q  or output or other 
alternates.
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Chapter 8 . Single Microprocessor Study Conclusions.
The single microprocessor study has shown that by observing 
certain formats for software layout, most transient hardware bus faults 
are recoverable. This recovery strategy produces a small overhead in 
running time and memory. The Recovery Block technique used also enforces 
a degree of design discipline onto the software engineer to produce a 
structured format to his software.
8 .1 .  Acceptance Test.
It has been found that care must be taken in designing the acceptance 
test for a particular process. A  compromise must therefore be made between 
the amount of testing in the acceptance test, and the overhead incurred.
8 .2 .  CPU Local Storage.
The Recovery Block, in its simplest form provides protection and 
recovery mainly from faults that lead to data corruption. The integrity of 
the data is improved by a procedure where variables are read into CPU 
registers, followed by the particular process, and fin a lly  the updating of 
variables only after the acceptance test has been passed. This method leads 
to a greater probability that data within memory is un corrupted, and is 
already available in some high level language compilers.
8 .3 .  The Watchdog Timer.
The introduction of a watchdog timer resulted in a small software 
overhead, additional software was used for setting up, starting and resetting 
the timer. The overhead was less than one per cent for software, in addition  
to a simple counter for tuning system operation. The use of a watchdog 
timer highlights the importance of a system approach to fault tolerance 
through the combined use of hardware and software to increase the ava ilab ility  
of the system. The increase in ava ilab ility  that was obtained by the use of a 
Recovery Block structure and a watchdog timer is shown in F ig .8 .1 .
The recovery mechanism used consisted of entry to an alternate  
routine either by failure of the relevant acceptance test or following 
execution of a fault detection interrupt service routine. A simple
60
interrupt service routine kept recovery time to a minimum. The number of 
the process being executed at the time of the fault was read, and a 
check was made that it was within an expected range. The process 
number was then used as an entry to a process re-entry look up table 
stored in RO M , followed by a jump to the relevant process re-entry point. 
System variables are only updated following successful completion of the 
relevant acceptance test; it is assumed that a copy of valid  system 
variables remains within the RAM area. If this assumption is invalidated, 
for example by a momentary power failure, then a fail safe state is 
entered shortly afterwards through the mechanism of a count being 
exceeded within an alternate routine.
8 .4 . Default Data Bus.
The use of a watchdog timer generally provides recovery when the 
microprocessor's program counter is corrupted to a value outside the 
segment being processed. In addition, there are situations when the 
program counter stays within the segment, but the segment is either 
completed too quickly or not within time; this latter case is particularly  
important in real time systems. If the program counter is corrupted 
to a value outside of the segment being processed, then it can be 
situated in one of two areas of memory. First, the program counter 
can be corrupted to a value which corresponds to another segment, and 
secondly the program counter can be set to a value which corresponds 
to unimplemented memory. This latter situation arose in the study 
and recovery time was decreased by the use of default resistors on the 
data bus. These resistors were used to trigger a software interrupt 
when the microprocessor attempted to execute an instruction from 
unimplemented memory. Furthermore the same recovery routine can be 
used as that for the watchdog timer.
8 .5 . Microprocessor Dependent Facilities.
A growing number of microprocessors have traps for detection of 
illegal conditions such as attempted execution of illegal instruction.
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bus error and division by zero. System recovery can take place under 
these conditions if the trap vectors are set equal to the vector of the 
hardware timer.
8 .6 .  Use of Trap Areas.
The majority of real time systems have critical areas of software 
where a correct procedure must be carried out before an action can be 
taken. The Recovery Block technique is useful in this situation whereby 
the setting of flags can be checked within an acceptance test.
However, this situation can be improved by the use of trap areas 
between segments in a critical area of software. This prevents the 
microprocessor from running on from one segment into another.
Recovery takes place i f  the program counter is set equal to an address 
within the trap area, provided that the trap is filled  with a suitable 
software interrupt.
8 .7 .  Performance Counter.
In real time control systems it is important that a counter is 
provided within alternate routines as degraded performance may be 
acceptable only for a certain period before a different system strategy is 
required.
8 .8 .  Built in Test.
A  built in test fac ility  is often used for operator confidence and 
for diagnosing faults in the fie ld . The Recovery Block technique can 
be used as an aid in testing and diagnosing faults. It was previously 
mentioned that a counter can be used within certain alternate routines 
so that continued degraded performance is prevented. Whilst the 
system is in a standby state, the counts from the alternate routines can 
be used as an input to the built in test equipment and provide information 
on possible faults. For example, a certain alternate routine entry may 
be associated with the defective reception of information from 
a peripheral; this information can aid test equipment in diagnosing 
a fault.
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8 .9 .  In Conclusion.
The use of a Recovery Block structure established that the 
mechanism is a useful tool which can be integrated into the design of 
real time system for improved a v a ilab ility . The most important 
additions to the basic structure are the use of a watchdog timer and a 
simple counter within alternate routines. It has been stated that the 
Recovery Block is not capable of recovering from software errors due to 
incomplete or inconsistent requirements specification. This situation 
can be improved by the use of independent design of alternate  
routines to simulate an N-Version Programming approach without the 
need for massive redundancy, although this is very d ifficu lt to 
achieve in practice.
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Chapter 9 . Introduction to the Distributed Processing System.
The single processor study demonstrated that increased ava ilab ility  
under prescribed fault conditions was obtained using protective 
redundancy. This confirmed that the propagation of faults from one 
process to another could be stemmed by the use of a fault detection 
and recovery strategy. The next objective of the research study was to 
investigate the possibility of increased a va ilab ility  for a distributed 
processing system undertaking the tasks of target tracking and missile 
guidance, as described in Chapter 4 . The nature of the increased 
system complexity required to undertake these tasks, together with the 
locations in which they would normally be undertaken involved the 
decomposition of the system into subsystems.
The first objective was to establish a design philosophy for 
communication between the subsystems; this being described in the 
following section.
9 .1 .  Design Philosophy for Inter Processor Communication.
The Recovery Block technique ensures that only valid data is passed 
from one process to the next, by use of the acceptance test. The 
following process simply takes the data and uses it without any need for 
testing its va lid ity . This approach can then be extended to a distributed 
processing environment in the following manner.
Consider the transmission of data from one microprocessor subsystem 
to another using a communications link. The use of a Recovery Block 
structure within each subsystem ensures that only valid  data is transmitted. 
The design philosophy for message passing follows im plic itly , i . e .  that 
data testing is carried out at the point of maximum information 
(transmission) with the absence of testing data on reception. This is 
shown schematically in F ig .9 .1 .  The testing of data is carried out by 
an acceptance test prior to transmission, the data is assumed to be valid  
if  it is received correctly with respect to the particular communications 
protocol. If a transmission failure occurs, for example incorrect parity, 
then a request for re-transmission can be made.
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When message passing is carried out between subsystems then the 
transmitting subsystem is said to be active whilst the receiving subsystem is 
passive. The transmitting subsystem has a responsibility to provide valid  data 
with the use of local recovery if  necessary, while the receiving subsystem 
need only w ait for data.
9 .2 .  Local Recovery Strategy.
The in itia l aim for recovery from a fault within a distributed 
processing system is the attempted recovery on a local basis, that is within  
the subsystem. A  schematic diagram of local recovery is shown in 
F ig .9 .2 .  This figure shows the importance of localising the effect of a 
fault and the prevention of propagation to other subsystems.
In view of the experience and results obtained for the single 
processor study, it  was decided to continue with a similar strategy for each 
of the microprocessors within the distributed system. The Recovery 
Block structure was discussed in Chapter 7 and when implemented within 
each microprocessor subsystem provide the basis for local recovery.
The absence of reception of expected data leads to another 
principle, i . e .  the message transfer proceeds only in one direction.
If a message fails to arrive then the receiving subsystem must not attempt 
to diagnose the failure to transmit, instead it must in itiate global recovery 
after a predetermined time period.
The concept of global recovery is introduced in the following
section.
9 .3 .  Global Recovery Strategy.
In a real time distributed processing system, it is possible that 
local recovery may fail or that communication between processors may fa il.  
Under these circumstances, in a master/slave system then the master can 
w ait only for a predetermined time before action has to be taken.
This action of global recovery can take place in the event of failing to 
receive data from a slave. Global recovery can simply be seen as failing  
to pass the acceptance test of a routine in the master which is requesting
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data, and the subsequent transfer to an alternate routine.



















system able to 
transmit valid  
data)
Remarks
(a) Acceptance test 
in master passes: 
no communication 
faults.
(a) Acceptance test 
in master passes.
(b) Fault occurs in 
slave after 
transfer of data.
(c) Local Recovery 
attempted in slave 
but fails.
(a) Master requests 
data, four 
retries are carried 
out.
(b) Acceptance test 
in master fails as 
no data ava ilab le .
(c) Alternate routine 
in master entered.
(a) Acceptance test 
in master passes.
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This alternate routine then provides data that can be used by the 
system for continued operation. This data may be a default value or the 
last correct value received. The action of transfer to an alternate routine 
prevents the maximum system latency being exceeded. However, 
continued entry of this routine may be dangerous to the system and may 
occur in the presence of a permanent failure of one of the microprocessor 
subsystems. This type of failure is considered in the following section.
9 .4 .  Task Swapping .
If a permanent failure occurs in a slave then global recovery is not 
possible over a prolonged period, due to the repeated entry of an alternate  
routine within the master. Such a failure would only be retrieved if  
redundancy were to be included. Under these conditions it becomes 
necessary to use an alternative processor to carry out the function of the 
failed slave.
Having described a recovery strategy for the distributed processing 
system, the next point for consideration is the manner in which the system 
is distributed. The criteria governing this,together with the approach 
which was adopted is discussed in the following section.
9 .5 .  Functional Decomposition of System.
The manner in which the functional decomposition is carried out is
26
an essential feature of the system recovery strategy . The factors 
to be considered in this respect being as follows:
1. Inter processor communications to be kept to a minimum.
2 . Separation by function or process
3. Considerations of physical locality  of functions.
The function of the distributed processing system was to perform 
the target tracking process and the missile guidance loop equations, 
which are divided into those of the digital controller and the missile 
autopilot. This provided a natural split into three sub-functions, each 
of which could be perfom.ed by a separate microprocessor. This natural 
division also meets the three criteria stated above which is shown
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schem atically in F ig .9 .4 . ,  with the realisation of the sub-functions being 
described in Chapter 5 . The generation of raw target data is carried 
out by a Fortran program running on the PDF 11 in a similar manner to that 
used in the single processor study. Intercommunication between the 
subsystems was carried out using a high integrity data highway lin k .
For continuity of design and use o f existing software, the Z8000  
microprocessor was chosen as the processing element for each of the 
subsystems.
In order to effective ly  monitor the detection and recovery from 
faults, it was necessary to inject faults onto the distributed processing 
system. A  description o f how this was achieved is given in the following  
section.
9 .6 .  Injection of Faults in Real Time.
In the single processor study faults were injected by halting the 
processor, selecting the fault by switches and then single stepping, 
one system instruction being executed with a corrupt address or data bus. 
This approach, when extended into a distributed processing system would 
require the synchronisation of a ll the processors, which was considered 
to be an over complicated solution. The problem then was how to inject 
faults in real time on one of the microprocessor subsystems.
In itia lly , faults were to be injected by means of pseudorandom 
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generators . This was dropped in favour of the following approach as it  
was considered that it would be more informative by injecting repeatable 
faults in known positions of the software, in so far that the type of fault 
injected is directly correlated to the observed failure at a systems leve l.
9 .6 .1 .  Mechanism of Fault Injection.
The mechanism of fault injection used in the distributing processing 
research was as follows. A  hardware register is loaded by the micro­
processor with a fault address, prior to the operation of the system.
When the processor reaches this address in the software, a comparator 
is activated by the two addresses ( i .e .  hardware register and address bus)
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being identical. This is shown schematically in F ig .9 .5 .  A  non-maskable 
interrupt is then generated and the interrupt service routine activates 
the fault.' For example, the interrupt service routine may either read a 
variable and corrupt it ,  or corrupt the stack or stack pointer.
A t the end of the short interrupt service routine the microprocessor 
loads the hardv\are register with the next fault address. Finally the 
'return from interrupt' instruction returns control to the module being 
executed prior to the interrupt, or to another address if  the stack has 
been corrupted. Provided that the interrupt service routine is short 
enough, say less than 1% of a system cycle, then a fault can be injected 
in real time.
9 .6 .2 .  Specific Cycle Fault Injection.
This mechanism can be used to in ject a fault within a specific 
predetermined cycle as shown in F ig .9 .6 .  The interrupt service routine 
then reads the cycle number; if  the cycle number is the one in which the 
fault is to be injected then the predetermined fault is allowed to occur.
On every other cycle, the cycle number is found not to be equal to the 
required cycle number and a 'return from interrupt' instruction is then 
executed. The overhead incurred in adopting this procedure was in the 
order of a few tens ot micoseconds which was generally short enough not 
to invalidate the system operation for the research model.
An alternative method of injecling a fault onto a specific system 
cycle would be the use ot a maskable interrupt which could then be 
enabled on the specific cycle. This approach was not used as it 
involved modifying the system software, that is, it requires the addition 
of enable and disable interrupt instructions and a recompilation of 
software i f  a different fault address is required.
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Chapter 10. The Distributed Processing System Description.
As described previously the distributed processing system used in 
this study is based on three active processor subsystems which perform the 
system function, together with a standby processor subsystem for failure  
recovery v iz . task swapping as shown in Fig. 1 0 .1 . Communication 
between subsystems was carried out using a high integrity serial data 
highway, a description of which is contained in this chapter.
The microprocessor used in the single processor study was utilised as the 
basis for one of the subsystems. The other three subsystems consisted 
of identical processor cards which were constructed to the author's design. 
The facilities offered by these common processor cards are described in 
Chapter 1 0 .1 . The link selector shown also in Fig. 1 0 .1 . comprises a 
manual switch arrangement for routing the program loading of the subsystems 
via the RS 232 data lin k .
The requirement for the data highway between the microprocessor 
subsystem was based on the following criteria:
1. Distributed processing power
2 . High communication bit rate
3 . A b ility  for system expansion
4 . High integrity communications
It was considered important to make a choice of data communication system
which had an established message format and protocol. This led to the
28
decision to implement M IL -  STD 1553B , which has been developed 
for high integrity data communications between aircraft subsystems.
An overview of M IL -  STD 1553B can be found in Appendix F.
1 0 .1 . Central Processing U n it.
The subsystem processor card designed for the real time control 
system is based around the Z8000 microprocessor. An RS232 serial 
interface is included on the card to provide communication with a visual 
display unit. The default baud rate was set to 9600, but different 
rates can be selected by the interconnection of wire wrap pins on the card.
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Details of the baud rate selection can be found in Table 1 0 , 1 ,
The card contains 4K bytes ot static RAM and allows for up to 8 K
bytes of EPROM. A  4K byte monitor on the card is derived from that
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on the Am 96/4016 Evaluation Card. The memory maps of each 
processor subsystem are identical and are as shown in F ig .6 .3 .
The card also contains the logi c, as described in Chapter 9 .6 .  for 
the injection of faults in real time.
The circuit diagram, layout diagram and parts list are shown in 
Figs. 1 0 .2 . and 1 0 .3 . and Table 1 0 .2 .
1 0 .2 . Microprocessor to 1553B Interface.
The data highway interface was designed to meet the requirements of 
M IL -  STD 1553B for communication with a Z8000 microprocessor.
The interface was capable of acting as either a bus controller or as a 
remote terminal. The position of a d u a l-in -lin e  switch on one of the 
interface cards decided which mode of operation was to be used for the 
term inal. The design uses a single twisted pair bus, although the standard 
allows up to three redundant buses, in addition to the active bus.
The interface appears to the Z8000 as a number of memory addresses as shown 
in Table 1 0 .3 .
A  schematic of the microprocessor to 1553B interface can be found 
in Fig. 1 0 .4 . and shows that the message path between the serial bus and 
the Z8000 is achieved by the use of a 32 word F IFO . A  control register 
decides whether the word to be sent or received is a command, data or 
status word. The interface was designed on the principle that a remote 
terminal is always ready to receive a message but is not always ready to send 
a message.
A  simple time out circuit on the transmitter of the interface precludes 
continuous transmission longer than 800 microseconds, implemented as a 
monostable which is triggered by a request to send a message.
Thus the failure of a bus controller results in a quiet bus with no transmissions, 
due to the tim e out. The 1553B standard allows ten message formats although
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only two of these are required for this study, these being bus controller to 
remote terminal transfer and remote terminal to bus controller transfer.
1 0 .2 .1 .  Control and Status Register.
Control and status information within the interface consists of two 
registers, one for read and one for w rite, having the same address.
The function of the control and status register bits is shown below; 
these bits form the data word which is either read from or written to 
the status register. Each b it of the status register is valid  only when the 
terminal is either a bus controller (BC) or a remote terminal (RT). The 
exception is b it 9 in the read status which is valid in both modes of operation, 
Read Status;










ME(RT) A  logical *1* indicates that the last 
message was invalid .
C/RT A  logical '1 ' indicates that the terminal is
configured as a bus controller.
A  logical 'O' indicates that the terminal is 
configured as a remote terminal
BUSY(BC) A  logical '1* indicates that a busy status
return was received from a remote terminal.
BUSY(RT) A  logical '1 ' indicates that the remote 
terminal is unable to send data.
Not used.
ME(BC) A logical '1 ' indicates that the message error
b it was set in the last status return.
OR(RT) A  logical '1 ' indicates that the FIFO contains
valid data.
T/R (RT) A  logical '1 ' indicates that a request for data
has arrived. A  logical 'O' indicates that 
data has arrived in the interface.
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Write Status:
Bit N o . T itle  Function
0 BUSY(RT) A  logical '1 ' sets the busy b it within the
status word.
1 DBCA(RT) A  logical 'T  sets the dynamic bus conlrol
acceptance b it within the status word.
2 SUBFLG(RT) A  logical 'T  sets the subsystem flag w ith in
the status word.
3 SERREQ(RT) A  logical sets the service request b it
within the status word.
4 - 1 5  N ot used.
The interface was built on two Eurocards; the circuit diagrams, 
layout diagrams and parts list can be found in Figs. 1 0 .5 . ,  1 0 .6 . ,  1 0 .7 . ,
1 0 , 8 . and Tables 1 0 .4 . and 1 0 .5 . Figure 1 0 .9 . shows a photograph 
o f the two interface cards.
The operation of the interface is best described by considering 
its use as a bus controller and then as a remote terminal under the operations 
of sending and receiving messages.
1 0 . 2 . 2 . Message from Bus Controller.
Consider the interface configured as a bus controller, and requiring 
to send a message to a remote terminal. In itia lly  the microprocessor 
loads the FIFO with the message to be sent followed by the loading of the 
command word with the transmit/receive b it set to receive. Note the 
transmit/receive b it is set depending upon the direction of the message w ith, 
relation to the remote terminal being addressed. When the command word has 
been loaded, the microprocessor then initiates the transfer, as shown in 
the  timing diagram in Fig. 10 .10 . The low to high transition of the in itiate  
command enables the Manchester Bi-Phase encoder, which sets 
the SEND DATA output high when it is ready to receive data. The 
command word is converted into serial data, which is clocked into the 
encoder at a rate of one b it a microsecond. After the sync and encoded
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data are output, the encoder adds on an additional b it which corresponds to 
the parity for that word.
The encoder produces bipolar outputs which are used to drive an 
isolating transformer via a long tailed pair as shown in Fig. 1 0 .7 .b .
The connection between the isolating transformer and the bus is achieved by 
means of a stub and a coupling transformer as shown in Fig. 1 0 .1 1 . The 
coupling transformer for each interface is housed in a shielded box at the 
back of the expansion box.
When SEND DATA goes high after transmission of the command word 
the first data word is clocked out of the F IFO , The data word is 
converted into serial data and then clocked into the encoder when the 
encoder is ready to accept data. The converted serial data word is 
preceded by a data sync which is different from the sync which precedes 
the command word, as shown in F ig .F .2 . After the last word has been 
transmitted, the bus controller then expects to receive a status word 
from the addressed terminal to confirm that the message has been received.
If this status word is not received within 15 microseconds of the last data 
word being sent, then a response time out occurs. Note the 1553B standard 
requires that a bus controller w ait at least 14 .0  microseconds before 
allowing a no response time out to occur; no maximum time period is 
specified within the standard. The time out can be used to inform the 
microprocessor that message handshaking has failed; which can then be 
followed by a re-transmission or other predetermined course of action.
1 0 .2 .3 . Message to Bus Controller.
Consider now the operation of a bus controller requesting a message 
from a remote term inal. A  subaddress field of five bits within the command 
word can be used to signify, for example, a request for a particular data 
type. The controller sets the word count field  equal to the required 
message length, the transmit/receive b it equal to transmit, and the 
address and subaddress fields to their relevant values. This command word 
is loaded into the command register followed by an in itiate transfer command
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from the microprocessor subsystem. The low to high transition of the 
in itiate command enables the Manchester Bi Phase encoder; 
the timing diagram is shown in Fig. 1 0 .1 2 . The serial form of the command 
word is clocked into the encoder when it  sets SEND DATA high.
The addressed terminal identifies its own address within the command 
word and signals the subsystem processor that a message is required.
If the message has not been preloaded into the interface then the subsystem 
would have set the busy bit within the status word which is transmitted 
to the bus controller. The status word is decoded by the AAanchester 
Bi-Phase decoder which sets TAKE DATA high. The bus controller 
recognises that the remote terminal was unable to transmit the message 
at that time, it then waits for a predetermined period, before re-transmitting 
the command under subsystem control. The period of waiting is under 
control o f the subsystem processor, and was typically set between fifty  
to a hundred microseconds.
During the period ot w aiting, the transmitting subsystem processor 
identifies the relevant message and loads it into the interface. The busy 
bit in the status register of the remote terminal is also reset so that when 
the request is received again then the message is automatically transmitted. 
On this occasion, the bus controller decodes the status word and recognises 
that the required message follows the status word. The data is loaded, 
one word at a time into the FIFO; after the last data word 
C O N T IG U IT Y  FAIL goes high since there was no bus activ ity  for a 
period of four microseconds since the last data word. The length of the 
message requested is checked with the number of words received to confirm 
that the message has been correctly received.
1 0 .2 .4 . Message to Remote Terminal.
Consider the operation of a remote terminal receiving a message.
The first word received is the command word which is decoded by the 
remote terminal. Having ensured that the message has the correct 
address, the interface loads the word count into a latch and clears the FIFO
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ready for the message. In addition a signal VALID  COAAAAAND SYNC  
goes high which starts the receive cycle; the timing diagram is shown 
in Fig. 10 .13.
As each word arrives it is decoded into serial data with the decoder 
setting a VALID WORD signal high if  the word is valid . The serial word 
is converted into a parallel 16 b it word, loaded into the FIFO and the 
word counter is incremented. At the end of the message the interface 
recognises a period without data syncs, and sets C O N T IN G U IT Y  FAIL 
high. The value of the word counter is then compared with the word 
count from the command word. If these two values are equal then the 
message has been correctly received and the subsystem processor is 
interrupted to indicate the presence of a message. The Manchester Two 
BrPhase encoder is enabled and the status word is sent to the bus controller. 
If the word counts are not equal then an error has occurred and the 
subsystem processor is not interrupted. The occurrence of an error sets the 
message error b it in the status register and the status word transmission 
is suppressed.
1 0 .2 .5 . AAessage from Remote Terminal.
Consider the operation of a remote terminal sending a message.
When a request for data is received, a signal VALID  COMAAAND SYNC  
goes high, as shown in the timing diagram in Fig. 10 .14 . The encoder is 
enabled and the status word is clocked into the encoder and transmitted.
On the falling edge of SEND DATA, the interface determines whether a 
message has been loaded into the F IFO .
If a message has been loaded then one word is read at a time from 
the FIFO; each word is converted into serial data before being sent 
as part of a contiguous message. However, i f  no message has previously 
been loaded into the FIFO the busy b it is set w ithin the status word return. 
This indicates to the bus controller that the remote terminal was unable 
to send a message in response to the request. Due to the time constraints 
of the 1553B standard ( i .e .  respond with status word within 12 microseconds)
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there is insufficient time to load a message into the FIFO after receiving
a transmit command and before it is necessary to send the status word.
The subsystem processor is then interrupted and can then load the required
message into the FIFO and release the busy within the status register.
On the next request to transmit the message is sent to the bus controller.
1 0 .2 .6 . 1553B Protocol Fault Injection.
The encoding and decoding of Manchester Two Bi-Phase Level
data within the interface was carried out by a customised integrated
29
circuit, the Harris 15530. This integrated circuit sets the word
length to 20 bits os defined by the 1553B standard. An alternative
30
integrated circuit similar to that above, the Harris 15531 was used 
within one of the interfaces and allows 1553B protocol faults to be injected  
onto the bus. The integrated circuit is similar to that described above 
except that the frame length and parity are programmable for both the 
encoder and the decoder. A  frame length of between six and thirty 
two bit periods can be obtained with this device, which is set up by 
writing to address 6FEJ2Ï. The b it pattern and the corresponding frame 
length can be found in Table 1 0 ,6 .
This interface was also constructed on two Eurocards, whose circuit 
diagrams are found in Figs. 1 0 .5 . and 1 0 .1 5 . The corresponding layout 
diagrcm and parts list for F ig .10 .15 . are to be found in F ig .1 0 .1 6 . and 
Table 1 0 .7 .
1 0 .3 . Communications Software.
The available time for designing and building the 1553B interface 
was lim ited, therefore the decision was made to use the Z8000 processor to 
pass data in and out of the interface rather than use DM A which would 
have been more elegant. However, this decision did not affect the 
performance of the distributed processing system as sufficient free time 
was available to allow the processor to transfer the data.
The communications software written for this study is described 
by considering the sending and receiving of messages to and from the
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bus controller and a remote terminal, as follows:
1 0 .3 .1 . Message from Bus Controller.
The sending of a message is performed as shown in Fig. 1 0 .17 .
The processor clears the FIFO prior to writing the message one 16 b it word 
at a time into the FIFO . When the message has been loaded, the command 
word is loaded into the command register. This command word contains 
the address of th e  remote terminal which w ill receive the message and the 
word count of the message. F inally , a send command is given and the 
message is sent under control of the interface.
Under normal conditions the message transfer is then complete; 
however, if  no status return is received from the remote terminal in 
question, then an interrupt is generated and the sequence can be repeated.
1 0 .3 .2 .  Message to Bus Controller.
The request and reception of data is performed as shown in 
Fig. 1 0 .1 8 . The message sequence starts with the processor loading the 
command word register and then in itiating the transmission. If the 
busy b it is set in the status word from the remote terminal then an interrupt 
occurs. The interrupt service routine increments the busy count (number 
of requests given a busy reply), clears the interrupt flip  flop and returns 
to the calling program which repeats the sequence. If the busy is not 
set in the status word then no interrupt occurs and the message is read from 
the FIFO within the interface after a short delay.
1 0 .3 .3 .  Message to Remote Terminal.
The reception of a message is performed as shown in Fig. 1 0 .19 . 
When data is expected from the controller the interrupt is enabled.
On reception of a receive command, an interrupt is generated and the 
message is loaded into memory. On return from interrupt the remote 
terminal then disables the interrupt.
1 0 .3 .4 . Message from Remote Terminal.
The sending of a message by a remote terminal is performed as 
shown in Fig. 10 .20 , It is assumed that the busy b it within the status
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register is set; when a request for data first appears the busy reply is given. 
The request for data triggers an interrupt; the interrupt service routine 
then loads the message into the interface. When the request appears 
again the message is sent, this condition is recognised by the subsystem 
processor which then sets busy for the next request.
1 0 .4 . Systems In tegration and Test.
As for the single processor case, system integration and test 
programs were developed for this phase. These consisted partly  
of programs written for the single processor togehter with communications 
test schedules. These programs have not been included in this thesis.
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Qiopter 1 ] . Design Strategies: Distributed System.
This chapter presents strategies for detection and recovery from 
transient and permanent hardware faults,and their implementation in 
hardware and software within a real time distributed processing system.
The approach was, first to inject faults onto the control system which had 
no recovery mechanism. Having gained experience from the single 
processor study on the effect of faults, i t  was fe lt unnecessary to inject 
a large number of random faults but instead to inject faults to give  
typical or specific faults. Having obtained a baseline, the basic 
Recovery Block was implemented upon the target tracking and digital 
controller software.
Other techniques, for example the use of a watchdog timer, 
developed in the single processor study were then implemented in order 
to localise the effect of faults. Global recovery was used to prevent a 
system crash or an unsafe system state when the localisation of the 
effect of faults was not possible.
The performance of the distributed processing system was obtained 
using the results of tracking a single target, whose characteristics are 
described in the following section. The subsystem is operated wholly in 
track mode and for the purposes of the distributed system, a run is 
considered to start at missile launch.
1 1 .1 . Target Characteristics.
The target used for the distributed processing study was different 
from that of the single processor study and had the following characteristics: 
START P O SIT IO N  4000 4700 200 (metres)
H E A D IN G  -  100 4000 200 (metres)
VELO C ITY 250 (metres/second)
This target was chosen as it gave a missile angle characteristic, as shown 
in Fig. 1 1 . 1 . ,  which has two phases of missile fligh t, i .e .  that of 
gathering and the terminal phase. In addition, the missile range is not 
equal to the target range until approximately 1 0 . 8  seconds, as shown
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în Fîg.n . 2 . ,  thus allowing the system to recover under d ifficu lt fault 
conditions.
The target tracking software was modified slightly from that used in 
the single processor study, and involved the use of 1 2 0  sectors to represent 
360° instead of the 30 sectors previously used. This increase in the 
number of sectors allows more accuracy to be obtained in target tracking, 
due to the higher resolution.
The use of 120 sectors gives a sector spacing of 3 ° , and the effect of 
this can be seen in Fig. 11 . 1 . The missile does not lie  on the exact angle 
as the target during the terminal phase but can still said to be tracking 
the target. Tracking can be justified as the missile lies within the same 3 °  
sector as the target, and the system cannot distinguish one edge of this 
sector from the other edge. Thus during the terminal phase the missile 
believes it  is on the same azimuth as the ta rget, and a target hit is 
considered to have occurred if  the missile angle is within the same 3°  
sector when the ranges are equal. This situation is adequate for the 
purposes of demonstrating system recovery, but can be improved by the use 
of smaller sectors and the use of feedforward terms in the missile guidance 
loop.
The operation time of a single run was extended from ten to fifteen  
seconds, this was simply a convenient time which was greater than the time 
for the missile range to be equal to the target range. In taking results the 
criterion taken was to compare the missile angle under fault conditions with  
the true missile angle obtained under no fault conditions. Each run was 
continued to fifteen seconds even if  a target hit occurred before this time. 
The measurement of performance is described in the following section.
1 1 .2 . Performance Index.
A  quanti ta ti/e  measure of performance was required to assess the 
performance of the system under different fault conditions. The use of 
ava ilab ility  as a measure is quite good but does not differentiate between 
a single long unoperational period and many short periods. In many
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applications, it  is not sufficient just to recover from a fault but it  is 
important that fast recovery takes place as in the case of a missile 
tracking a target. In addition, the time at which a fault occurs is 
important, for example, a fault occurring at nine seconds after missile 
launch has a higher probability of disrupting system performance than a 
fault occurring a t three seconds.
The missile flight consisted of two distinct phases, that is the 
gathering and the terminal phases. During the gathering phase the missile 
to target angles are large in contrast to the small angles obtained during 
the terminal phase. Since the guidance control is closed loop, the system 
recovers naturally from propagated data corruption type faults. However, 
the natural recovery period is like ly  to be significant and may result in a 
failure of the mission particularly if  the fault occurs during the terminal 
phase. Thus it  is important that data corruption type faults are not 
allowed to propagate and that the system is always in a known state.
In order to penalise slow recovery and large errors from the expected 
performance, the following measure, called a Performance Index was used
Performance Index = /  ^  \2 m  i \
/q t(error) dt  ( I i . l . )
The upper time lim it of the integral occurs when missile range is 
equal to target range.
1 1 .3 . System with No Recovery .
In itia lly  the system was configured as shown in Fig. 1 1 .3 .  without 
any protection or recovery schemes to provide a baseline set of results.
Two types of faults were considered, that of data corruption and faults that 
caused the digital controller to crash.
1 1 .3 .1 .  Data Corruption Type Faults.
Using the mechanism described in Chapter 9 .6 .  faults were in itia lly  
injected to produce data corruption effects. First, consider faults 
introduced during the gathering phase, i .e .  up to about eight seconds 
after the start of the run. The effect of corrupting the target angle 
presented to the missile guidance loop can typically be as shown
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în Fîgs. 1 1 .4 . and 11 .5 .  Fîg, 11 .4 . shovs the effect of corrupting the
target angle to a value of -  3° for a period of eight iterations ( l /1 5 th  second)
at two seconds after the start of the run. This value is a legal target angle,
however such a jump in target angle is un likely  to occur under no fault
conditions. This results in a maximum deviation of 6 .0 5 °  and a performance
2
index of 6 5 .0(seconds. degrees) . Fig. 1 1 .5 . shows the effect ot
corrupting the target angle to a value of -  6 °  for the same period a t four
seconds after the start o f the run. This also gives a maximum deviation
of 6 .0 5 °  with a performance index of 112.3(seconds. degrees)^.
A  data corruption type fault occurring in the output of the digital
controller corresponds to the missile being given an incorrect guidance
demand. The effect of setting the guidance demand to zero a t 1 /4  second
from the start for eight iterations is shown in Fig. 1 1 .6 . This figure
shows a maximum deviation of 8 .4 9 °  and represents a performance index
2
of 152 .2(seconds, degrees) . The effect of data corruption occurring
during the gathering phase, as shown in Figs 1 1 . 4 . ,  1 1 .5 .  and 1 1 , 6 .
is to change the plot of missile angle but does not affect the terminal
phase of the missile.
The time taken to recover from a data corruption fault within the
gathering phase was between two and six seconds. If this recovery period
is repeated during the terminal phase then the effect of the fault is to
cause the missile to miss the target. In the terminal phase the recovery
period was generally shorter as shown in Figs. 1 1 .7 . and 1 1 . 8 . which
indicates that tracking was lost for between one and three seconds.
The effect of an uncontrolled overflow, due to a large target angle, in
the controller's calculation of lateral acceleration is shown in Fig. 1 1 .9 .
This effect is quite severe causing the missile to slew rapidly, giving a
maximum deviation of 1 4 .0 ° with a corresponding performance index of
2
14195.8(seconds, degrees) . Tracking is regained three seconds after 
the fault was introduced during which time the target was missed. The 
overall effect of data corruption in the terminal phase in a system without
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recovery is that there is a high probability that the target w ill be missed,
1 1 ,3 .2 ,  Controller Crashes.
The next stage was to consider the type of fault that led to a 
controller crash, i . e .  a total loss of system function. Typical causes 
of system crashes were found by studying the single processor results; 
a list of these causes can be found in Table 1 1 .1 ,
Twelve runs of the system were carried out, each run was faulted 
by one of the fau lt types listed in Table 1 1 .1 , The faults were injected  
within the calculation of the difference equations by substituting one of 
the instructions in Table 1 1 .1 . for a system instruction. O f  these 
twelve faults, a ll caused a loss of system function except fault type 
number 2 , The introduction of a relative jump meant that the program 
counter stayed local to the correct value and a system crash did not occur; 
the effect was one of data corruption. This cause was eliminated from 
further consideration of faults that cause the system to crash if  no protection 
or recovery is applied.
1 1 .4 . Basic Recovery Block.
The previous section identified two different types of fault and their 
effects; the next step was to implement the basic Recovery Block and 
monitor its effectiveness in a distributed processing environment under 
these fault conditions. The basic Recovery Block was implemented within  
the target tracking processor and the digital controller processor to localise 
the effect of faults on total system performance. The implementation is 
described below followed by the resulting effect of the faults.
1 1 .4 .1 , Target Tracking Processor.
The basic Recovery Block implementation used was the same as for the 
single processor study (see Chapter 7 .2 . )  except that the software was 
modified to allow  1 2 0  sectors per revolution,
1 1 .4 .2 ,  D igital Controller Processor,
The digital controller, as described in Chapter 5 ,3 .  consisted of the 
addition of four difference equations. Each of the five units (four difference
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equations plus the addition) had its own Recovery Block with the acceptance 
test defined as ensuring the output is within the worst case limits.
The estimation of worst case limits can be found in Appendix G .
The outputs of the four parallel units and their addition can be found in 
Figs. n . lO .  and 1 1 .11 . and satisfy the results obtained in Appendix G .
In addition to acceptance testing, any overflow following an 
arithmetic operation resulted in the entry of the appropriate alternate  
routine. For simplicity, the alternate routine was to re-execute the 
primary routine.
1 1 .4 .3 . Data Corruption Faults.
The data corruption faults as described in Chapter 1 1 .3 .1 . were 
introduced into the system with the basic Recovery Block. O f  the faults 
introduced into the target tracking processor all were captured by the 
relevant acceptance tests. This resulted in no degradation in the plot 
of missile angle, even though a default or last value was used on several 
occasions. The explanation for this is that the output of the target 
tracking process is slow moving, with the target azimuth being updated once 
per second.
Now consider faults injected into the controller software, as before, 
the output of the digital controller difference equations was corrupted and 
set to zero. The acceptance test was entered and the output passed the 
test. The resulting missile angle plot was the same as for the system with 
no protection, i . e .  as in F ig ,1 1 .6 . However, the effect of this fault 
occurring during the gathering phase does not influence the system's ab ility  
to enter the terminal phase.
The effect of allowing a large transitory target azimuth appear 
as input to the missile guidance loop was shown in Fig, 1 1 .9 . This caused 
overflow in the digital controller's difference equations. However, with 
the basic Recovery Block implemented within the target tracking 
processor, then the acceptance test trapped the large swing away from 
the target being tracked. The alternate routine was then entered and the
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previous value used; this resulted in the plot o f the missile angle being 
equal to that under no fault conditions. Thus, the extent of the fault 
was localised within the target processor and was not allowed to 
propagate to the digital controller.
1 1 . 4 .4 .  Controller Crashes.
The causes ot system crashes, as listed in Table 1 1 .1 . except 
fault type number 2 , were introduced into the controller software 
with a basic Recovery Block structure. All the runs failed to complete 
i . e .  a system crash occurred, except number ten (POP instruction).
This was due to the structure of the Recovery Block. The POP instruction 
results in the correct return address of a subroutine being taken off the 
stack, this led to the processor pointing to the wrong calling address 
when a return from subroutine was executed as shown in Fig. 1 1 .12 .
This led to omission ot the acceptance test following calculation of one 
of the difference equations. This omission was not a hazard to the system 
as the addition of the four parallel units is checked later in the cycle before 
a guidance demand is sent to the missile.
1 1 .5 . Use of Software Traps.
Some microprocessors, including the Z8000, have built in software 
traps to detect potentially hazardous situations, in addition to a software 
interrupt call for user software. The use of these traps was described in 
Chapter 7 .5 . ;  using this technique the system was run using the faults 
listed in Table 1 1 .1 .
In addition to those recovered from by the basic Recovery Block, 
numbers one and five did not cause a system crash using the technique of 
reading the process number and returning control to the appropriate 
alternate routine.
1 1 .6 . Addition of Watchdog Timer.
A  watchdog timer, as previously described in Chapter 7 .3 . ,  was 
added to the structure of the Recovery Block within the digital controller. 
The remaining faults from Table 1 1 .1 . (instructions most like ly  to cause
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a system crash) that were not recovered from using the mechanisms in 
Qiapter 1 1 .4 . (Basic Recovery Block) and 1 1 .5 . (Software Traps) were 
introduced into the controller software. A  time out occurred on each 
occasion leading to entry of the alternate routine. No degradation in 
system performance resulted from the injection of these faults.
1 1 .7 . Global Recovery.
Under fault conditions the 1553B bus controller may request data 
and repea tab I y receive a busy response. A lternatively the failure of a 
remote terminal may lead to the message error b it being set and the 
suppression of the status word. In a real time system, the controller ccnnot 
continually accept this situation and must take steps to maintain the 
integrity of the system. This section describes how the system can deal 
with the transient failure of a remote terminal, in this case the terminal 
attached to the target tracking processor. The permanent failure of this 
processor is covered in Chapter 1 1 . 8 .
1 1 .7 .1 .  Transient Failure and Recovery.
Consider the transient failure of the remote terminal belonging to 
the target tracking processor for one system cycle. The transient 
failure was simulated using the 1553B protocol fault injection interface 
described in Chapter 1 0 .2 .6 . At the required time of fa ilure, the frame 
length was adjusted to twenty one bits for a single cycle only. The target 
tracking process is a slow moving one, therefore the last correct value 
received by the controller is a reasonable estimate of the true position of 
the target.
The recovery of the system is explained by following the run of the 
above fa ilu re, with the aid of Fig. 11 .13 . On the fault cycle, the bus 
controller receives an invalid status word each time a request for data is 
made. This is allowed to occur a maximum of four times; this figure being 
set by the maximum latency allowed in the system. At this stage the digital 
controller assumes that the remote terminal is not going to reply and 
enters an alternate routine. This routine is a stepping stone between
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fault free operation and the permanent failure of a remote terminal or 
subsystem, thus a transient failure is first assumed.
11 . 7 .2 .  Example of Recovery.
For this example the system entered the alternate routine and the last 
correct data from the target tracking process was used. In addition, a 
counter was updated for the purposes of counting the number of times the 
alternate routine was entered; a maximum value of five was allowed before 
a permanent failure was diagnosed. The use of the last correct data 
corresponds to the target azimuth position which is used as the input to the 
missile guidance loop.
On the next cycle the target tracking processor responded correctly 
to the bus controller's request for data, and the target azimuth was sent from 
the remote terminal to the controller. This cycle and the following cycles 
were successfully completed.
The fault was induced in a cycle on which the target azimuth did 
not change, and as recovery took place the missile angle was exactly as in 
the fault free operation. If the fault had occurred on a cycle when the 
target azimuth had changed, the digital controller would have used the 
previous value on the faulted cycle and the true value on the next cycle. 
This would have resulted in the step change in target azimuth appearing 
1/ 12 0 th second later than it should have done.
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Chapter 12. Standby Processing Systems.
The previous chapter demonstrated the improvement ot ava ilab ility  
that can be obtained in a distributed processing system under fault 
conditions.
Consider now a system which decomposes into a given number of 
processor subsystems due to factors such as complexity, allowed latency, 
distribution of system peripherals and prevention of propagation of faults. 
How then is the decision made to include a further processor to increase 
system ava ilab ility  and performance under fault conditions and what 
function w ill it undertake.
The decision to add an extra microprocessor subsystem and the 
amount of fault tolerance within the other microprocessor subsystems, is 
based largely on system requirements, i .e .  how is the system expected to 
operate under certain specified conditions. The operating conditions 
may include environmental conditions such as EMP radiation, permanent 
or transient fau lt conditions, and difficu lty  of maintenance whilst in 
fie ld  use.
The processing power of an additional microprocessor system may be 
used for task swapping and/or health monitoring; these functions are 
described below.
1 2 .1 . Task Swapping.
The concept of using a standby microprocessor system is not a new 
idea, however it  is not sufficient to obtain a better performance under 
fau lt conditions. The additional processor may need to gain access 
to peripherals or transducers within the system, and this access w ill 
depend upon the physical system distribution and the ava ilab ility  of 
transducers . The use of the terminal attached to the standby unit as 
a remote terminal or os a standby bus controller w ill depend upon the 
number and nature of the remote terminals and the attached subsystems, 
and the requirement for continued system operation. For example, it may 
be imperative that a bus controller failure does not cause system fa ilure.
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1 2 .2 . Health Monitoring.
In many real time systems it  is important to give on operator 
confidence that the system is functioning fu lly  or in a degraded mode.
The importance of this confidence may vary depending upon environment 
and skill level of operator. In order to gain confidence that the system 
is operational it  is necessary to carry out routine health monitoring; 
this monitoring must be integrated into the design of the system.
In the system described the digital controller could send its immediate 
outputs of the difference equations to a standby processor on a regular 
basis. The reception of this data can then be used for health monitoring, 
that is, a signal from the bus controller to confirm the functional state 
of the system. In the event of a bus controller or digital controller 
subsystem, the standby processor can use the last valid  set of intermediate 
outputs rather than restart the difference equations from zero.
1 2 .3 . Use ot Field Test Data.
The system requirements may or may not be sufficient to determine 
the system configuration; additional data in the form of field test data, i f  
availab le , can be used for the basis of the decision. This field  test 
data can be gathered, if possible, from existing equipment using for 
example the same transducers and/or operating in similar environmental 
conditions. From this data, it may be deduced, for example, that 
transient faults predominate or that a certain transducer is critical 
to the operation of the system or that the communications link is prone 
to burst errors. The fie ld  test data can be used to decide whether the 
system operational requirements are like ly  to be met with a certain 
configuration and determine the level of fault tolerance within the 
subsystem and the need for a standby microprocessor system.
Having considered aspects of a standby processing subsystem, the 
following sections describe the recovery process that takes place 
following a subsystem failure and the associated achieved performance.
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12 .4 . Failure of a Remote Terminai.
The addition of a fourth processor subsystem was provided in order 
that system recovery could take place when a complete processor subsystem 
fa iled . This section describes the recovery that takes place following  
a remote terminal failure whilst the system is tracking a target.
During the four processor study the raw target data was loaded 
into the memory of the missile processor, as this processor is assumed fault 
free. This involved the building of an additional memory card whose 
circuit diagram, layout diagram and parts list can be found in Figs. 1 2 .1 .  
and 1 2 .2 . and Table 1 2 .1 . The placement of this raw data within the 
memory of the missile processor enabled the system to obtain target data 
even in the presence of the digital controller or target tracking processor 
fa ilure. This involved a small modification to the software, that is on 
each cycle the bus controller has to get the raw data and give it to the 
target tracking processor. This involved a time overhead but it was small 
compared to the cycle time, thus having no effect on system performance.
The arrangement of the four processor subsystems and the software is shown 
schematically in Fig. 1 2 .3 . ,  where the fourth processor contains a copy of 
the target tracking process and is idle during fault free operation.
1 2 .4 .1 . System Recovery.
Consider the permanent failure of the target tracking processor and 
the associated recovery. For this example, the failure of the target tracking 
processor results in a busy reply when a request for data is made. On the 
first cycle of the fa ilu re, a maximu m number of busy status returns are 
received, leading to entry of an alternate routine shown in F ig .1 2 .4 .
The last correct value of target azimuth is used and the guidance demand 
calculated. System considerations determine that no more than six 
consecutive entries of the first alternate routine were allowed. The 
fau lt, being permanent, after five cycles causes the system to enter the 
alternate routine for a sixth time and then assumes a permanent 
failure.
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The second alternate routine is then entered and this effects the 
use of the fourth processor to take over the failed processor's function.
On the first cycle in this alternate routine, the digital controller has to 
give the standby processor sufficient information to take over the failed  
function. In this case, the bus controller sends the radar azimuth position 
and the azimuth on which the target lies. The reception of these variables 
by the standby processor acts as a wake up signal, with these variables 
being used as a starting point of the function.
It is assumed that time is limited on this sixth cycle and so the 
digital controller again uses the last stored value of the target azimuth.
On subsequent cycles the digital controller enters the a lte rn a te  routine, 
sends raw data to and receives target azimuth positions from the standby 
processor.
1 2 .4 .2 . System Performance.
If the failure of the target tracking processor occurs at least six 
cycles before a change in target azimuth then no difference in the 
resultant missile angle is obtained. The digital controller has no 
knowledge of the targets range or velocity  characteristics and so a 
period of graceful degradation occurs for a period less than one second 
until the standby processor identifies the target.
If the failure of the target tracking processor occurs less than 
six cycles before the target azimuth position is due to be updated, then 
the resulting missile angle plot w ill be different from that of the unfaulted 
one. This is due to the effect which can be seen schematically in 
Fig. 1 2 .5 . The standby processor does not identify a target on a 
particular cycle until approximately one second after the fau lt, and 
uses the target azimuth value prior to the fau lt.
Two runs were carried out with a failure of the target tracking 
processor occurring less than six cycles before the target azimuth was due 
to change. In the first run, the fault was introduced at one second after 
the start of the run. The resultant missile angle plot can be found
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in Fig. 1 2 .6 . and shows that only the gathering phase is affected and the
missile still enters the terminal phase successfully. A  maximum deviation
of 2 ° was recorded with a performance index of 4 6 .5(seconds, degrees)^.
The second run involved a fault at approximately eight seconds, i . e .
during the terminal phase. The resultant missile angle plot can be found
in Fig. 1 2 .7 . and shows that the system regained tracking within three
2
seconds, giving a performance index of 1 5 4 .9 féconds, degrees) , and a 
maximum deviation ot 1 .4 4 ° . As the angle was within three degrees of the 
true un foul ted angle at eleven seconds, then the run was considered to be 
successful . Eight seconds from the start of the run, was found to be the 
latest time that such a fault could occur without affecting mission success.
1 2 .5 . Failure of a Bus Controller.
The failure of the target tracking processor during system operation 
did not cause system failure due to recovery taking place with the aid of a 
standby processor. Intu itively, the failure of the bus controller is like ly  
to have a much greater effect on system performance. This section 
shows by way of examples how the recovery from such a failure can take 
place and its effect upon system performance.
The configuration of the four processor systems, was as shown in 
Fig. 1 2 .8 . with the standby processor idle under no fault conditions. 
Consider then the failure of the digital controller whilst tracking a target.
The function of the digital controller is to execute a number of 
difference equations to calculate the guidance demand of the missile, 
if  another processor has to take over then it is advantageous to use a good 
estimate of the past values of the four parallel units rather than restart 
the difference equations from zero. The outputs of the four parallel units 
can be seen in Fig. 1 1 .1 0 . which shows that the best estimate for 
previous outputs is in fact zero.
It was assumed that the failure of a bus controller would result in 
a prolonged period of inactiv ity  or a prolonged period in which invalid  
commands are being transmitted on the bus. This period was detected by
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the failure to retrigger a monostable by the val id command sync pulse 
derived from the bus monitor. The output of the monostable was then polled 
by the microprocessor subsystem to detect the bus controller failure.
For the purposes of the study the minimum period of inactiv ity  was set to 
four milliseconds from the receipt of the last valid command sync pulse, 
this being shown in Fig. 12 .9 .
Thus the detection mechanism consisted of a retriggerable monostable 
which was continually retriggered during normal bus operation giving a 
logical ' 1 ' output. Following bus controller failure the monostable is not 
triggered and the output falls to a logical 'O'.
1 2 .5 .1 . Use of Bus Monitor.
The failure of the bus controller was carried out by the use of the 
non-maskable interrupt mechanism as previ ously described. The subsystem 
processor (digital controller) was put into a halt condition, thus taking 
no further part from the time of failure to the end of the run. In practice 
the failed bus controller must not be allowed to issue further commands, 
after it has deemed to have failed by a bus monitor. This can be carried 
out, as shown schematically in Fig. 12 .10 . by the use of a discrete 
which disables the output of the bus controller. This discrete is set by 
the bus monitor on detection of a prolonged inactive bus period.
Having detected prolonged bus inactiv ity  the bus monitor 
then assumes bus control. The standby processor must then obtain the 
target azimuth from the target tracking processor and read the missile 
angle. The missile to target error angle is used as input to the 
difference equations, setting previous inputs equal to the present input, and 
the previous outputs of the four parallel units equal to zero. The system 
then continues as normal during which time coverage is still given by the 
target tracking processor.
1 2 .5 .2 . Effect of Failure on Performance.
The effect of the bus controller failure on the missile angle depends 
upon when the failure occurs during the run. The greatest deviation in
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in the missile angle occurred when the failure took place in the
gathering phase. This occurred due to the starting up of the difference
equations immediately after bus controller fa ilure. During the
gathering phase the target to missile error angle is large and not equal to
zero, even if  zero is the best estimate. A  failure at one second after
the start of the run results in the missile angle plot as shown in Fig. 1 2 .1 1 .
This shows a large deviation from the true missile angle (9 .5 ° )  with
recovery taking about eight seconds, resulting in a performance index
2
of 7 3 8 .5^econds. degrees) . This large deviation affects the missile
angle during the gathering phase but shows that tracking still occurs before
the target is reached.
The effect of the failure occurring later in the gathering phase
results in a smaller excursion from the true missile angle as can be seen
from Figs. 12 .12 . and 1 2 .1 3 ., which show the effect of a failure at two
seconds and four seconds respectively. The failure at two seconds gives a
maximum deviation of 4 .0 1 °  with a performance index of 140.5(seconds.
2
degrees) , whilst the failure at four seconds resulted in a maximum
deviation of 2 .6 5 °  and a corresponding performance index of
2
128.90econds. degrees) .
During the terminal phase of the missile, the missile to target error
angle is small, and the outputs of the four parallel units are close to zero.
Thus i f  a failure occurs during this phase the effect of setting the parallel
outputs to zero (in the standby processor) is like ly  to be less than that
in the gathering phase. This is like ly  to result in a shorter recovery
time and a smaller excursion from the true missile angle. Failure of the
bus controller was carried out at seven, eight and nine seconds after the
start of the run, giving maximum deviations of 2 .3 5 ° , 1 .9 9 °  and 1 .2 4 °
respectively. The resulting plots can be found in Figs. 1 2 .1 4 ., 12 .15 . and
1 2 .1 6 .,  these represent performance indices of 3 9 .1 , 20 .5  and
2
1 2 .7 féconds, degrees) . The graphs show that the time to recovery and 
the maximum excursion ore less than that in the gathering phase and
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that mission success is not affected by a bus controller failure even in the 
terminal phase of the missile.
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Chapter 13. Distributed Processing Conclusions.
The implementation of fault tolerant techniques within a 
distributed processing environment has resulted in an increase in ava ilab ility  
under extreme operating conditions. However, it must be stressed that 
redundancy does not automatically increase the re lia b ility  ot a system.
A poor implementation of a fault tolerant technique may actually result 
in a decrease of system re lia b ility .
13 .1 . Review of Design Philosophy.
The use of a Recovery Block within subsystems which form part of a 
distributed system provides recovery on a local basis. This ab ility  to 
recover locally  has led the author to establish a design philosophy for 
message passing between processors. This philosophy is based on 
testing data at the point of maximum information, i . e .  at the point of 
transmission of the message, and the absence of testing data on reception.
The testing of data is carried out by an acceptance test prior to 
transmission; the data is assumed to be valid i f  it is received correctly 
with respect to the particular communications protocol.
The absence of reception of expected data leads to another principle, 
i . e .  that message transfers proceed only in one direction. If a message 
fails to arrive then the receiving subsystem must not attempt to diagnose 
the failure to transmit; instead it must in itiate  global recovery after a 
predetermined time period. If the receiving device were allowed to 
attempt fault diagnosis of the transmitting subsystem a loop would be 
closed around the communications link, and the system would become more 
complex and probably more unreliable.
1 3 .2 . Distributed Processing Recovery.
The distributed processing research has shown that by using the 
Recovery Block as a basis, transient and permanent faults can be recovered 
from generally without a severe loss of performance. System recovery was 
shown to take place whilst real time control was being performed, without 
massive redundancy as in triple modular redundancy.
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The faults injected were divided into two groups, i . e .  data 
corruption type faults and system crash type faults. The distributed 
processing system without a recovery mechanism was still able to track 
targets when the data corruption type faults were injected during the 
gathering phase. The effect of data corruption in the terminal phase 
let to a high probability of missing the target being tracked.
By definition this sytem was unable to recover from system crash type faults.
1 3 .2 .1 . Local Recovery.
The implementation of the basic Recovery Block within the 
distributed processing system ensured that recovery took place when data 
corruption type faults were injected into the target tracking and digital 
controller processes. This implementation was unable to recover from 
system crash type faults; this confirmed the results of the single processor 
study. The use of the time domain in the form of a watchdog timer and 
the use ot system traps for illegal conditions led to recovery from the system 
crash type faults.
1 3 .2 .2 . Global Recovery.
If local recovery from a particular fault was not possible, then 
global recovery was shown to maintain the system functional. Global 
recovery was performed by the use of an alternate routine in the master 
processor subsystem, and is necessary it transient faults prevent the master 
from receiving valid  data. The use of local recovery means that there is 
a high probability that the processor's communication interface is loaded 
with data, but cannot guarantee correct communication of data.
Under these conditions, global recovery is necessary to ensure valid  
data and continued system operation.
1 3 .2 .3 . Use of a Standby Processor.
If system ava ilab ility  is required to be high then the use of a standby 
processor system may be justified. The failure of a slave subsystem was 
performed and dynamic task swapping was shown to give good results when 
the system was tracking a target. The task swapping was initiated vben a
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counter exceeded a predetermined lim it within an alternate routine in the 
master processor subsystem. This was followed by enabling the standby 
processor with the necessary starting values. The failed subsystem took 
no further part and all communication with the particular function was 
made to the standby processor. This type of failure did not affect system 
success provided it occurred more than three seconds from the target.
In a master/slave system, the master is critical for continued 
operation and high a va ilab ility . A  bus controller failure was carried out 
which did not lead to a system crash due to bus inactivity detection 
circuitry within the bus monitor. Assuming that the bus controller fails 
quietly, i .e .  no bus communication traffic , then this effect can be used 
to in itiate  take over of bus control. The new bus controller must ensure 
that the failed bus controller takes no further part in the operation of the 
system. The results showed that failure of the bus controller, even in the 
terminal phase of the missile did not affect the obj ective to h it a target. 
System performance was only slightly impaired as shown by the low 
performance indices recorded in the terminal phase, as shown in 
Chapter 1 2 .5 .
The take over of control by the bus monitor was fast and occurred 
within one system cycle. The degradation in performance was due to the 
of the digital controller's difference equations in the new master 
subsystem. This performance can be improved if  the intermediate outputs 
of the difference equations are regularly transmitted to the bus monitor.
The transmission of these outputs can also act as a health monitoring signal 
to the bus monitor. In the event of the bus controller not failing quiet, 
the absence of a health monitoring signal can be used to signify a failure  
of the bus controller, without waiting for a quiet period on the bus.
1 3 .3 . Further W ork.
The modelling of hardware re liab ility  is well established, unlike 
the field of software re lia b ility  modelling which is a comparatively new one. 
However, in the view  of the author the problem is being tackled incorrectly
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since the all important point is the re liab ility  of the system. Few 
researchers (if any) have tackled the self imposed problem of combining 
hardware and software models to give a system re liab ility  model. This area 
needs consideration before too much time is spent on developing software 
re liab ility  models.
The system described in this thesis was operated without need for 
an operating system. Some real time systems may require a kernel to 
supervise the operation of parallel co-operating processes. Such a kernel 
would also require fault tolerance for high re liab ility .
Further work is required to establish the implementation of a Recovery 
Block structure within such a system. It is like ly  that the kernel would 
be considered as the highest level of software and perform acceptance 
on processes either running or to be run.
The single processor study involved applying mainly single faults 
with a small percentage of double faults. This was considered to be 
sufficient within the time ava ilab le , however further work could be 
usefully spent by studying the implementation of a Recovery Block 
structure under multiple fault conditions. An important area for 
investigation is the development of robust software specifically for areas 
where input data is like ly  to be corrupt.
In the distributed processing study, a standby processor was 
effectively used for continued systems operation under the conditions of a 
failed subsystem. Under normal operating conditions the standby processor 
is idle and could be used for system health monitoring, that is to monitor 
and record the state of the system.
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Chapter 14. Towards an integrated Approach to Design.
The approach used in this report was to investigate different 
strategies including the assessment of their performance in order to arrive  
a t a system with high ava ilab ility  under prescribed fault conditions.
The experience gained from the study is used here to discuss guidelines 
for the design of a re liab le  system. In addition, these guidelines 
have been applied to the design of a single microprocessor target 
tracking system; this design is illustrated using a MASCOT  methodology.
14 .1 . Guidelines for Design.
The use of redundancy is often necessary in order to achieve 
system re lia b ility  and ava ilab ility  requirements. However redundancy 
must be applied methodically to ensure that system complexity is not 
unnecessarily increased. This section presents guidelines for the design 
of reliable systems.
1 4 .1 .1 . Functional Decomposition.
The functional decomposition of a system is an essential feature 
of the system recovery strategy. The factors to be considered 
are:
1. Separation by function or process.
2 . Interprocess communication kept to a minimum.
3. Consideration of physical locality  of functions.
4 . Functions need to be a manageable size for a complete 
understanding of the total system.
1 4 .1 .2 . Recovery Block.
The use of a Recovery Block structure must be justified within the 
systan to be designed. Consideration should be given to the overhead 
incurred with relation to the increase in ava ilab ility  obtained. The 
single processor study gave an increase from 5%  to 42%  ava ilab ility  
(with fail safe). This must be weighed against the overhead in sottware 
resulting from the use ot the structure; a figure of 30%  additional software 
was found to be typ ica l.
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1 4 .1 .3 . Watchdog Timer.
The use of the time domain for im plicit fault detection was 
considered to be an essential feature of any real time system. The 
watchdog timer is simple in hardware terms, consisting of a programmable 
timer which can set an interrupt flip  flop. An interrupt service routine 
must be written to determine the process which was being performed at the 
time of the fault and transfer control to the relevant re-entry point.
Results from the single processor study showed an ava ilab ility  of 85% , 
an increase of 43%  over the basic Recovery Block structure.
1 4 .1 .4 . Run Time Overhead.
The overhead in time, incurred by using a Recovery Block structure 
is dependant upon the complexity of the acceptance tests and the 
environment in which the system operates. If the environment is noisy 
e lectrica lly  then transfer of control into alternate routines is like ly  to 
be common.
1 4 .1 .5 . System Traps.
Any unused software or hardware traps available within the 
processor must be restored to the same address as that for the hardware 
timer. A  log of fault interrupt causes can be kept for continuous 
monitoring and maintenance purposes.
1 4 .1 .6 . Reversionary Modes.
Systems design must take account of reversionary modes of 
operation upon fault detection. A  safe shutdown of the system is 
often desirable i f  a hazardous condition is detected.
1 4 .1 .7 . MASCOT A C TIV ITY  CHA NNEL POOL (ACP) Diagram.
An in itia l design is illustrated using an ACP diagram, which
shows the Activities of the system and the Intercommunication Data Areas. 
The reader is referred to R ef.6 . for information on MASCOT. An 
inadequate decomposition of the system w ill result in a large ACP 
diagram with highly interconnected activ ities.
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The overall system design is illustrated as a hierarchical set of 
ACP diagrams. Decomposition is carried out to a depth necessary to 
achieve a reasonable level of functional modularity.
1 4 .1 .8 . Fault Scenarios.
Having decided upon a hierarchical set of ACP diagrams then 
system designers should study the diagrams to identify situations which 
might compromise safe system operation. If a hazardous situation is 
identified then a fail safe mechanism or alternative strategy is necessary.
1 4 .1 .9 . Design Reviews.
Design Reviews should be carried out to ensure that the system 
specification requirements are adequately stated and can be feasably met.
A  design Review should cover the following points:
(i) C larity  of software structure.
(ii) Tolerance o f software to hardware errors.
( i i i )  Design proving requirements.
(iv) Requirements for configuration control.
(v) Safety.
(v i) System development tools.
(v ii) Acceptance procedures.
(v iii)  Reversionary modes of operation.
(ix ) Software/Hardware trade offs.
1 4 .1 .1 0 . Structured Walkthroughs.
The structured Walkthrough is similar to a Design Review except 
that it is carried out with greater frequency. It is concerned with the
design of a subsystem or part of a subsystem and covers the following points:
(i) Function.
(ii)  C larity  of structure.
( ii i)  Speed of operation.
(iv) Test requirements.
(v) Fault detection and recovery.
(vi) Size of software.
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1 4 .1 ,1 1 . Testing.
The use of a Recovery Block structure has the advantage that testing 
of software can be modular and more thorough thus removing a greater 
percentage of design errors. In top down testing, the top level is 
tested first, a lower segment is added and the combination tested.
This is repeated down to the lowest leve l. Dummy segments temporarily 
replace the segment subordinate to the segment under test. These dummy 
segments can vary in complexity and may return constants or may be a 
primitive version of the segment being simulated. To enhance structured 
programming the length of a segment should be lim ited to a mangeable 
leve l, say fifty  statements to enhance readability and comprehension 
whilst minimising page turning. Usually each segment w ill correspond 
to one function and can be implemented as a procedure with a descriptive 
name corresponding to the function. Thus the use of small segments makes 
programs easier to extend and maintain; re lia b ility  is further enhanced 
since test plans for the segments are easier to specify and execute.
14 .2 . Single Processor System.
Having discussed guidelines for reliable systems design, this section 
describes the in itia l design of a single microprocessor target tracking 
system. It is assumed here that the microprocessor to be used is capable 
o f the real time processing necessary.
1 4 .2 .1 . Functional Decomposition.
Using the factors detailed in Section 1 4 .1 .1 . it was decided to use 
the same decomposition as previously used. However the sub tasks w ill 
no longer be processed in a sequential order, due to the operation of the 
system in a MASCOT environment.
1 4 .2 .2 . Recovery Block.
It was considered that the use of a Recovery Block structure could 
be justified in order to obtain a high a v a ilab ility . The inclusion of a 
Recovery Block structure is not sufficient to increase system availab ility ; 
it  is necessary to ensure that the implementation is robust. The implementation
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of the Recovery Block structure on a particular processor system w ill result 
in a particular overhead, which is application dependent. The estimated 
overhead in software and hardware can be weighed against the increase 
in ava ilab ility  obtained. At present, as far as is known, this study 
represents the only source of information on the increase in ava ilab ility  
that can (not necessarily w ill)  be obtained by using a Recovery Block structure.
1 4 .2 .3 . Watchdog Timer.
The introduction of a watchdog timer can be justified here, as it  
involves litt le  overhead in software and hardware terms.
1 4 .2 .4 . Run Time Overhead.
The target tracking system is operated with an angular separation 
of 12°. The time taken for the processing w ill depend upon the 
processor chosen. A  correct choice of processor w ill allow  a Recovery 
Block structure to be used.
1 4 .2 .5 . Trap Areas.
The use of trap areas between code segments does not necessarily
result in an increase of a va ilab ility . However, this feature can be
effectively  used for safety purposes, that is to ensure that a routine is 
correctly entered. It is considered sufficient for this system to include 
a trap area immediately before each primary routine.
1 4 .2 .6 . Reversionary Abodes.
The reversionary modes of operation in the target tracking system 
simply consist of alternate routines relevant to the particular process.
The system is shutdown if  any alternate routine is entered on four 
consecutive cycles. This is considered to be the point at which the 
system can no longer give valid  outputs. No hazardous states exist 
within the target tracking system.
1 4 .2 .7 . MASCOT ACP Diagram.
The top level ACP diagram for the target tracking process is shown 
in Fig. 1 4 .1 . Whilst the system is in a standby state, i . e .  SEARCH mode, 
then time is available for checking of system hardware. Using a
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priority scheduler then the ac tiv ity  for hardware checking can run at the 
lowest priority. The design of an activ ity  scheduler is not considered 
here.
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Qiapter 15. O verall Review of Achievements.
This chapter reviews the research study in terms of the objectives 
set out in Chapter 1 . 1 . The study has conclusively shown that the 
ava ilab ility  of a system can be improved by a combination of measures 
as outlined in the following paragraphs.
For completeness the constituent parts of the main objective are 
repeated below, together with reference to the relevant chapters where 
they are achieved.
(a) 'To establish good design practices based upon a 
practical rather than a mathematical approach'.
Guidelines to design are discussed in Chapter 14 
which presents an integrated approach. This 
approach is applied to the design of a target 
tracking system as described in Chapter 1 4 .2 ,
(b) 'To establish a simple but obvious structure for system 
recovery'.
The Recovery Block was shown to be a basis 
for the design of reliable real time systems 
as described in Chapters 7 and 8 .
(c) 'To establish design criteria for reliable inter-task  
communication w ithin a single processor'.
The integrity of data was improved by a method 
wheréby system variables were not updated 
until the appropriate acceptance test had been 
successful. The system variables were then 
passed to the next task by the use of CPU 
internal registers as described in Chapter 7 .
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(d) 'To establish a design philosophy for message passing
between microprocessors in a distributed system in order 
to inhibit the propagation of faults'.
The concept of checking data before passing 
it to the next task was extended to the 
distributed processing environment where the 
receiving processor accepts data as valid unless 
otherwise indicated by the transmitting processor. 
This philosophy is described in Chapter 9 with 
results in Chapter 1 1 .
The overall conclusion of the research study was that for reliable  
systems operation, fault recovery must be localised to minimise the 
propagation of faults to the next task in a single processor system or to 
another processor in a distributed system. The conclusions for the single 
processor study are presented in Chapter 8 , whilst the distributed 
processing conclusions are presented in Chapter 13.
The in itia l objectives were to investigate recovery from transient 
faults; however opportunity was taken to extend the study to investigate 
failures of a catastrophic nature whereby a subsystem fails permanently. 
As described in Chapter 1 2 , the strategy adopted in this respect was to 
introduce a standby processor in a task swapping mode. Conclusions 
drawn from the results obtained are presented in Chapter 13.
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APPENDIX A
Digitisation of Guidance Loop.
In the following derivations the sampling period of the digitised 
system Is 1 /30  second.
A . I .  D igital Controller: G^(z)
G  (z) =  (1 - z " ’ ) .Z  /  K  1 0 (s + 1 ) (s + l) (s  +  0 . 5 ) \
\ s s(s +  3 . 16)(s +  3 .1 6 ) I
= 0  - z ' h . Z  h .  G ,(s ) j ................................... ............ ( A . I . )
By Partial Fractions
G  (s) = 1.685972102 +  0.500721038
s 2
s s
+  8.314027898 -  12.42839289
(s +  3 ,1 6 ) (s +  3 .16 )^   (A .2 . )
Then Z . / G , ( s ) \ =  1.685972102z +  0.016690701z
+ 8.314027898Z -  0.372861921z
z  -  0.900024464 _ 0.900024464)^ . . .  (A .3 . )
F inally  G ^(z) =  (1 -  z  ' ) . Z  /G ^ (s) \
s '
= 1.685972102 +  0.016690701
(z -  1 )
+  8 .314027898(z -  1) -  0.372861921 (z -  1) 
z  -  0.900024464 _ 0.900024464)^
= 10 -  29 .18785963z"’ +  28 .39590856z '^
______________________ -  9 .207881866z~^
1 -  2 .800048928z“ ’ + 2 .610092963z
-  0 .810044035z '^    (A .4 . )
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A .2 . Missile Autopilot: 0 2 (2 )
0 2 (2 ) = (1 -  z \ z  U  I  ]44________
'   ̂ s V  +  14s +  144)
= (1 - z " ’ ) .Z  I  I .  G^iS) \  (A ,5 . )
By Partial Fractions
G^(s) = 0.002507716 -  0.097222222 +  1
—  2 3
s s s
-  (0.002507716s -  0.062114198)
s + 1 4 s + 1 4 4   (A . 6 . )
Then Z . [ G J s) \ =  0.002507716z -  0.00324074z
( 4 - /  (z-l)2
+  0.000555555z (z +  1 )
( z -  1)^
-  (0 .002507716z -  0 .003037504z) 
z^ -  1.500869446Z +  0.627089085  (A . 7 . )
F inally G g(z) = (1 -  z ' ) . Z  /  G 2 (s)
\ s '
= 0.002507716 -  0.00324078 +  0.000555555 (z +  1)
(z -  1 )^
+  (z -  1 )(- 0 .002507716z +  0.003037504) 
z -  1.500869446Z +  0.627089085
= -  0 .000903767z"’ +0 .002798632z
-  0 . 002670325z'^ +  0 .000915696z'^
1 -  3 .500869446z"’ +  4.628827977z"^




This appendix contains a brief description of the Z8000  
microprocessor; further information can be obtained from Refs. 31,
32 and 33.
B . l .  Architecture.
The Z8000 is a single chip 16 b it microprocessor using N-Channel 
MOS technology and provides a multiplexed data/address bus.
The Z8000 CPU is a t present offered in two versions: the Z8001 
segmented version and the Z8002 non-segmented version; 
future versions w ill include a virtual memory capability. The Z8001 can 
directly address 8  megabytes of memory, whereas the Z8002 directly  
addresses 64 kilobytes. The two operating modes of the microprocessor, 
system and normal modes, and the distinction between code, data and stack 
spaces within each mode allows memory extension up to 48 megabytes 
for the Z8001 and 384 kilobytes for the Z8002.
The Z8000 CPU contains sixteen 16 b it general purpose registers, 
a status register (Flag and Control Word), a program counter, a program 
status area pointer and a refresh counter register.
B .2 . Interrupts and Trap Structure.
The Z8000 provides three types of interrupts (non maskable, vectored 
and non vectored) and four traps (system c a ll, unimplemented instruction, 
privileged instruction and segmentation trap). The segmentation trap is 
only available on the Z 8001 .
When an interrupt or trap occurs, the current program status is 
autom atically pushed onto the system stack. The program status consists of 
program counter, the Flag and Control Word, and a 16 bit identifier.
The identifier contains the reason or source of the trap or interrupt.
After saving the current program status, the new program status is 
automatically loaded from the program status area in memory which is 
directed to by the program status area pointer.
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B .3 . Memory.
The Z8000 uses four control signals in association with four status 
signals during memory read or write cycles. The multiplexed bus contains 
a valid address on the rising edge of Address Strobe (AS). The Data Strobe 
signal (DS) is used to indicate either valid data on a cycle or that 
the CPU expects valid  data on a read cycle. A  memory request
signal (MREQ) is active during all memory cycles.
Consider first a memory read cycle, the timing diagram is 
shown in Fig .B . 1. which assumes that the memory used has an access time 
comparable to one clock period. Slower memories can be used by the
addition of w ait states. At the beginning of the cycle the Read/W rite (R/W ) 
signal goes high. The rising edge of AS indicates a valid  read address, 
data can be placed on the bus after DS becomes active and is read by the
CPU on the rising edge of DS.
O n a memory write cycle (shown in F ig .B .2 . )  the R /W  line is low, 
and valid memory address is indicated as for the read cycle. Valid  data 
may be taken o ff the bus whilst Data Strobe is low.
B .4 . Input/O utput.
Input/O utput is carried out in a similar manner to memory accesses 
with the exceptions that the memory request line is not active , an automatic 
w ait state is inserted, and the status lines indicate an I /O  reference.
I /O  devices are addressed with a 16 b it port address.
Direct memory access (DM A) can be carried out over the Z8000  
multiplexed bus during which time the bus is driven by a DM A device.
B .5 . Instruction Set.














The Micromaster was developed by the Control Group at the 
University o f Bath, School of Electrical Engineering, for use as a 
microcomputer teaching a id . Its use as a teaching aid Is not described 
here since the Micromaster was simply used as an Intelligent terminal 
for the duration of this study.
The Micromaster contains a Z80 microprocessor and this was used 
to communicate with the PDP 11 through an RS232 port and with the 
Z8000 microprocessors through the other RS232 port. Temporary 
storage of system results was carried out using 32K bytes of dynamic 
RAM within the Micromaster.
The communication software written for the Micromaster 
basically consists of polling the serial Interface parts but Is not 
described w ithin this report.
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APPENDIX D 
Z8002 Microprocessor Program Assembler.
This appendix describes the two pass assembler which produces an 
object code file  and an assembly listing for the Zllog Z8002. This program 
runs on the PDP 11 under th e R S X -llM  operating system.
D . l .  Statement Format.
A  Z8002 assembly language statement Is defined as follows:
label: opcode operand(s) comments
The label and comment fields are optional, and no continuation 
lines are allow ed.
D. 1 .1 . Label F ie ld .
The label fie ld  may contain a user-defined symbol containing up 
to six characters, the first of which must be alphabetic. The assembler 
allocates the current location to the label, so that a user may make 
further references to the label without knowing Its address. A  symbol used 
In a label fie ld  may not be redefined In the label field of another 
statement.
D . l . 2 , Opcode F ield .
The opcode field follows the label fie ld  and contains one of the 
following:
1. Mnemonic operation code of a machine Instruction
2 . Assembler directive operation code.
The opcode fie ld  Is terminated by a space, tab, semi-colon when there are 
no operands or a carriage return when there are no operands or comments.
D, 1 .3 . Operand F ie ld .
The operand may contain up to four expressions or terms, depending 
upon the type or requirements of the opcode. The operand field  must 
follow an opcode and can be terminated by a semi-colon when a comment 
Is to follow or by a carriage return when there are no comments.
D . l . 4 . Comment Field.
The comment field Is used purely to help the user or future users
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on the workings of the assembly language program. It may be preceded 
by any or more of the fields previously mentioned. The comment field  
has no effect on the assembly and must be preceded by a semi-colon and 
terminated by a carriage return.
D .2 . Z8002 Expressions.
This section describes the components of legal Z8002 expressions 
which Include the Instruction set, numbers and characters.
D .2 .1 .  Character Set
The following characters are valid  In Z8002 source
1 . The letters A  to Z .
2 . The digits 0  to 9 .


















< V T > vertical tab




If  any character other than those above is encountered the line being 
assembled w ill be terminated and an *1' w ill occur on that line in the 
listing.
D .2 .2 .  Numbers.
Numbers used in the assembly language problem may be decimal, 
hexadecimal, octal or binary. Any number must be preceded by 
and one of the following; (denotes octal number), / \H  (hexadecimal),
$ (h ex ad e c im a l),/\D  (decimal) or no characters.
If  ' is followed by a number then the number defaults to decim al.
O ctal numbers consist of the digits 'O' to '7 ' only.
Hexadecimal numbers consist of the digits 'O' to '9 ' and the 
letters 'A ' to 'F '.
Decimal numbers consist of the digits 'O' to '9 '.
Binary numbers consist of 'O' and 'T  only.
A  truncation error ('T ' on the assembly listing) w ill occur if  the 
converted number is too large to fit into eight bits for byte operations, 
sixteen bits for word operations or thirty two bits for long word operations. 
All numbers are considered to be in two's complement arithm etic.
The binary representation of a number is not implemented for thirty two bit 
operations.
D .3 . Assembler Directives.
These are statements which are used at assembly time for ease o f 
programming such as set a label equal to a constant, and are non 
executable as far as the Z8002 microprocessor is concerned.
D .3 .1 .  T it le .
The title  directive is used to print a heading on the output listing. 
The heading w ill be printed on the first line of each page of the listing. 
For example,
TITLE PRO GRAM TO CALCULATE SQUARE ROOTS 
The 'TITLE' directive appears in the opcode fie ld , if omitted the 
title  defaults to 'M A IN ',
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D .3 .2 .  Page Ejection.
Apart from the automatic page e jec t after 61 line counts, a form 
feed may also be used to cause a page e je c t.
D .2 .3 .  O R G .
The location a t which the machine code is to be placed may be 
changed by the O R G  d irective.
For example,
label: O R G  $3000 ; comment
w ill place the following code in memory locations starting at 3000^^. 
D .3 .4 .  E Q U .
The EQU directive assigns a value to a symbol name, which w ill 
be used when that symbol is further encountered in the program. The 
directive is of the form:
name EQU value ; comment
The symbol name must appear in the label fie ld  without a following  
colon and cannot be re-defined within an EQU directive.
D .3 .5 .  SET.
This is identical to the EQU directive, except that the symbol 
name may be redefined.
D .3 .6 .  EN D .
The END directive indicates the end of the source program. It may
have an optional label and/or comment fie ld . Any statement following  
this d irective w ill be ignored by Z8002.
D .3 .7 .  DEFINE WORD.
The Define Word (DW) directive is used to set a memory location  
to a user determined value and is of the following form:
label: DW value ; comment
D .4 . Instruction Set.
The instruction set for use with the assembler may be found in 
01 /2  Processor Instruction Set A/ 
for use with the Z8002 microprocessor.
32




















D .5 .  Addressing Modes.
This section describes the addressing modes available for use with 
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FRED (Rl)




The assembler contains a permanent symbol table whose entries 




















































64 b it Registers
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Symbol Meaning
N Z  Not zero
ZR Zero






NE N ot equal
EQ Equal
N O V  Overflow  Is reset
O V  Overflow Is set
GE Greater than or equal
LT Less than
GT Greater than
LE Less than or equal
LGE Logical greater than or equal
LLT Logical less than
LGT Logical greater than
























FLGB Flag byte -  used in LDCTLB instruction.
D .7 . Using Z8002.
The assembler may be run as follows: 
y  Run Z8002.
Z8002 > FILE, FILE = FILE 
Where FILE = program to be assembled which must have a 
The above command generates an object file  and a list file  which is sent 
to the printer. O n ly  an object file  is created if  the command line is 
as follows:
Z8002 > FILE = FILE
D .8 . Error Codes.
Two types of error can occur.
1 . Errors which halt assembly are as follows:
? BAD SWITCH ? The switch specified was not
recognised.
? T O O  M A N Y  INPUT FILES ? O n ly  one input file  may be
processed a t a time.
? N O  INPUT FILE ? No input file  was specified.
? T O O  M A N Y  OUTPUT FILES ? Too many output files were
specified.
? WRITE ERROR ?
? SYMBOL TABLE FULL ?
? INTERNAL FAULT ?
An error occurred when attempting 
to write to output file .
All the available symbol table 
space has been used.
A  software fault has occurred.
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2 . Errors which terminate assembly of single statement only and 
are as follows:
Q  Questionable syntax error.
T Truncation error.
*  An assembler directive was encountered which is
not va lid  in Z8002.
P A  phase error occurred, i . e .  a label's definition or
value differed from first pass to second.
I An illegal character was encountered.
U An undefined symbol was encountered.
E No END directive was encountered.
L Statement length was greater than 92 characters;
extra characters were ignored.
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APPENDIX E
Target Tracking Process -  Acceptance Tests and Alternate Routines.
This appendix describes the acceptance tests and the alternate  








E .1 .1 . Read: Acceptance Test (see F ig .E . 1 .)
The following tests were carried out:
1. Check range gate w ithin range, i . e .  range g a t e 6 .
2 . Check velocity  gate within range, i . e .  velocity  gate.^ 4 . 
3 i Check that range and velocity  channel valid flags are
set i f  'target detected' flag is set.
4 . Check that azimuth position counter within range,
i . e .  0 ^  azimuth.^ 29,
E .1 .2 . Read: Alternate Routine (F ig .E .2 . )
O n failure of the primary read routine, the last azimuth position 
is read and updated. The 'target detected' flag is reset indicating no 
target.
E .2 .1 . Azimuth Inhibit: Acceptance Test (F ig .E .3 .)
The following tests were carried out:
1. An error is signalled it 'ta rget azimutb' is not valid  and the 
flag 'w ithin azimuth limits' is set.
2 . Check that 'target azimuth' is within limits,
i . e .  0 ^  target azim uth^ 29 .
3 . Check that missing scans counter (for approach/recede 
assessment) is greater than or equal to zero. If  less than zero for any reason 
then an error is flagged.
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E .2 .2 . Azimuth Inhibit: Alternate Routine (F ig .E .4 . )
The alternate routine for processing azimuth inhibit is based on a 
target detection decision. If  no target is detected on the azimuth on 
which the alternate routine is entered, then a ll parameters are unmodified.
If  a target is detected then 'target azimuth' is updated and the missing 
scans count is set to zero. In addition, the 'w ithin azimuth limits' flag 
is cleared and cannot become set again until the radar has rotated 360^ 
minus half the width ot the azimuth inhibit arc . As a target has been 
detected then coverage information w ill be given, determined by a later 
process.
E .3 .1 . Range Inhibit: Acceptance Test (F ig .E .5 . )
The following tests were carried out:
1. An error is indicated i f  'azimuth inhibit' is set and 
'range inhibit' is not set.
2 . If  'target range' is valid and the missing scans count is 
larger than two, then an error is indicated if  'target range' does not 
equal the range gate set, or i f  'range inhibit' is not set.
E .3 .2 . Range Inhibit: Alternate Routine (F ig .E .6 . )
The alternate routine sets 'range inh ib it' i f  'azimuth inhibit' 
is set. I f  a target is detected and is not inhibited by azimuth 
considerations then 'target range' is updated.
In this simpler routine, range inhibition rules ( i .e .  -  1 range gate) 
are not used. Thus i f  a target is detected following a system error 
(an error must have occurred in order to enter the alternate routine) 
then it  is tracked, A  target being tracked at the time of the error may 
be lost if  multiple targets exist. It was thought better to track a 
target whose position is known exactly then use the position of a target 
whose characteristics may have been corrupted.
E .4 .1 . Set Binaries: Acceptance Test (F ig .E .7 . )
The following tests were carried out:
1 . Check that velocity binary is within limits,
i . e .  1 ^  velocity b in ary^  4 .
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2 . Check that range binary is w ithin limits,
i . e .  range binary^^ 6 .
E .4 .2 . Set Binaries; Alternate Routine .
The alternate routine in this case is to re-execute the primary 
routine to set the appropriate binaries.
E .5 .1 . Process Binaries; Acceptance Test (F ig .E .8 . )
The following tests were carried out:
1. If  either alarm is set, ensure that 'binaries' flag is set.
2 . I f  provisional external alarm is set, ensure that system is in 
search mode.
If the acceptance test passes and the provisional external alarm is set, then 
the external alarm is set.
E .5 .2 . Process Binaries: Alternate Routine.
The alternate routine would attempt a re-execution of the primary 
routine to determine whether the binaries are allowed to signal an alarm . 
E .6 .1 . ApproacK/Recede Assessment: Acceptance Test (F ig .E .9 . )
The following tests were carried out:
1. An error is indicated if  both approach and recede are 
indicated^
2 . An error is indicated if  neither approach nor recede is 
indicated whilst the system is in track mode.
E .6 .2 . Approach/Recede Assessment: Alternate Routine (F ig .E . 1 0 .)
The alternate routine is a clean up and get out procedure, and is 
simply the setting of the approach/recede assessment to approach.
E .7 .1 . Coverage Assessment: Acceptance Test (Fig. E. 1 1 .)
The following tests were carried out:
1 . I f  'no coverage' flag is set, check that no provisional 
coverage indications are set.
2 . Check that one and only one provisional coverage 
indication is set.
If the acceptance test passes, then set 'out of cover' or 'in cover' as 
appropriate.
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E .7 .2 . Coverage Assessment; Alternate Routine (F îg .E . 1 2 .)
If  either 'no coverage' or 'cancel' is set then coverage 
indications are set, otherwise a fail safe procedure is carried out by 
setting missile coverage to 'in  cover'.
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APPENDIX F 
An Overview  of M IL-STD 1553B
The 1553B standard was developed largely for aircraft internal 
transfers and defines a master slave communications protocol over a twisted 
pair. The exchange of messages along the twisted pair (bus) is 
precisely defined w ith ten allowable formats; the two formats which were 
used in this study are shown in Fig. F. i . Message formats can be divided 
into two groups, i . e .  mode commands and data transfers. Mode commands 
are used to communicate with the bus hardware to aid the management of 
information flow , for example to shutdown a transmitter on a particular 
bus, as redundant buses are allowed. Data transfers along the bus 
consist of a message of not more than 32 words.
The standard allows three types of terminal to be connected to the 
bus. A  terminal is defined within the standard as *the electronic module 
necessary to interface the data bus with the subsystem and the subsystem with 
the data bus', w hile  a subsystem is the combination of hardware and 
software required to perform a specific function. A  master-slave protocol 
requires a master and is called a bus controller in the context of the 
1553B standard. The bus controller is in charge of a ll communication 
over the bus, i . e .  any message must be initiated by the bus controller.
The second type of terminal is called a monitor; this terminal being 
assigned the task of receiving bus traffic  and extracting selected 
information if  required. A  bus monitor is permitted to assume bus control if  
a set of predetermined bus transmission defects is detected. Finally a 
remote terminal is any terminal which is neither a bus controller nor a 
bus monitor.
O n ly  three types of word are permitted with the standard.
A  word is a sequence of 16 bits plus sync (3 b it times) and parity  
(1 b it time) as shown in F ig .F .2 . The first type of word is the command 
word which is always the first word of a message and is transmitted by the 
bus controller. The command word defines the type of message that w ill
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fo llow . A  transmît/receive b it within the command word establishes 
whether the message is to or from the remote terminal being addressed,
A  five b it address fie ld  specifies a unique address of a remote terminal 
for the purposes of the message. This address field allows a system to 
contain up to 31 remote terminals; the remaining address is used to 
communicate with a ll remote terminals. The second type of word is the 
status word, which is always the first word that is transmitted by a remote 
terminal in response to a message. This word contains the status 
condition of the remote terminal. The busy b it can be used by the 
remote terminal to indicate that it is unable to move data to or from the 
subsystem in compliance with the bus controllers command.
The message error bit indicates to the controller that one or more of the 
data words associated with the preceding receive command failed to pass 
the remote terminal's va lid ity  test. Finally a data word is used as 
part or whole of a message that may be up to 32 words in length.
The method of transmission along the bus is Manchester Two 
Bi-Phase level a t a rate of 1 .0  megabit per second. A  logical '1 ' is 
transmitted as a positive pulse followed by a negative pulse, while a 
logical 'O' is transmitted as a negative pulse followed by a positive 
pulse. A  transition through zero occurs at the midpoint of each b it 
time as shown in F ig .F .3 .
A  1553B word is valid i f  it  conforms to the following criteria:
1. The word begins with a valid  sync fie ld .
2 . The bits are in a valid Manchester Two Bi-Phase level
code.
3 . The information field has 16 bits plus parity.
4 . The word parity is odd.
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APPENDIX G
Worst Cose Limits for Parallel Realisation of Digital Controller.
The parallel realisation of the digital controller results in four 
parallel units which are added to give a guidance demand. The acceptance 
test for each of these four units was based on worst case outputs of the 
units. The worst case value for the guidance demand was achieved by the 
addition of the worst case values for the units.
The worst case outputs were obtained by using an input which is 
equivalent to a 90^ step. A  simulation run was then carried out on the 
PDP n  and the following results were obtained.
Worst Case Value used in
Output Acceptance test
Unit 1 - 5 . 2 7 -  6
Unit 2 -  0 .814 ± 1
Unit 3 -  24 .8 - 2 5
Unit 4 Ï 4 . 5 t s
Guidance Demand - 3 7
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F ig .2 .1 .  Cold Standby Redundancy.
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F ig .4 .3 . Taboo Channels.
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F ig .5 . S. Set Binaries.
ENTER
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F ig .5 .6 .  Process Binaries.
ENTER
CALCULATE
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F ig .5 .7 .  Approach/Recede Assessment.
ENTER
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F ig .5 .8 .  Coverage Assessment
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WORKING STORAGE FOR MONITOR
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F ig .6 .1 1 . Layout of Input/Output Board.
< u < y << u
G0<O'«CN>r>.>nn
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F ig .6 .1 5 . System Software Typical Operation,
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F ig .6 .1 7 . Implementation of Address Fault Logic.
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F ig .7 .3 .  Recovery Interrupt Service Routine.
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Fîg. 10 ,3 . Layout of Central Processing Unît.
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Fig. 10 .6 , Layout of 1553B/Microprocessor Interface Board 1 .
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Fîg. 10 .16 . Layout of 1553B Protocol Fault Injection Board.
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Fig. 1 0 .1 7 . Message from Bus Controller: Software Operation.
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Fig. n  . 13. System Recovery.
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SET TARGET A ZIM U TH  = AZIM U TH  
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RESET N O  COVERAGE FLAG
Fig. E .4 . Azimuth Inhibit Alternate Routine,
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RETURN
Fig. E .5 . Acceptance Test for Range Inhibit
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Fîg. E ,8 . Acceptance Test for Process Binaries.
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Fig. E. 12. Coverage Assessment Alfernafe Routine.
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Table 4 .1 .  Angular Rote Information.
Integrated Circuits
X I 74LS04 X2 74LS20 X3 74LS32
X4 74LS32 X5 74LS74
X9 -  X43 M M 2102A N
Table 6 .1 .  Parts List of Error Correcting Memory Board 1
Integrated Circuits 
X I 74LS86 
X4 74LS86 
X7 74LS157 
X I 0 74LS280 
X I 3 74LS154 
X I 6  74LS240 









X I 1 74LS280
X14 74LS154 








X I 2 74LS86 
X I 5 74LS240 
X I 8  74LS04 
X21 74LS280
X23 -  X32 M M 2102A N
Table 6 .2 .  Parts List of Error Correcting Memory Board 2.
Integrated Circuits
XI 74276 X2 74LS32 X3 74LS04
X4 74LS32 X5 74LS08 X6 74LS125
X7 74LS27 X8 74LS20 X9 74LS138
XIO 74LS00 x n 74LS74 X I2 74LS00
X I3 74LS93 X14 74LS00 X I5 74LS74
X16 4020B X17 74LS74 X I8 74LS08
X I9 74LS32 
X22 74LS138
Resistors (- 5%)
X20 74LS374 X21 74LS151
R1 -  R12 IK
Table 6 .3 .  Parts List of Input/Output Board.
Integrated Circuits 





X 8  74LS374
X3 74LS244 
X 6  74LS02 
X9 74LS195
Resistor ( -  5% ) 
R1 IK
Table 6 .4 .  Parts List of Buffer Card.
Integrated Circuits 
X I 74LS00 
X4 74LS125 
X7 74LS00 




X8  74LS00 
x n  74LS32
X3 74LS04 
X 6  74LS00 
X9 74LS04 
X I 2 74LS10
Resistors ( -  5% ) 






R3 5 . IK
+
Capacitors ( -  2 0 %) 
Cl 22pF C2 22pF
Note : R2 and R4 mounted on front panel of expansion box .
Table 6 .5 .  Parts List of Fault Infection Logic.
Connections of P I, P2  and P3 on CPU Card determine baud rate 
as follows:
9600 baud -  a ll open 
2400 baud -  connect PI to P3 
300 baud -  connect P2 to P3 
100 baud -  connect PI to P2 to P3
Table 1 0 .1 . Baud Rate Selection.
Integrated Circuits 
X I 74LS32 
X4 74LS44 
X7 74LS374 
XIO  74LS139 
X I 3 74LS32 
X I 6  M M 2114  
X I 9 74LS164 
X22 74LS32 










X 8  74LS374 
X I 1 74LS138 
X I4 M M 2114  
X I 7 M M 2114  
X20 74LS02 
X23 M M 2114  









X 6  74LS245 
X9 74LS74 
X I 2 74LS27 
X I5 M M 2114  
X I 8  74LS244 
X21 25LS2521 
X24 MM 2114  
X27 Am9551 
X30 74LS04 









































Capacitors ( -  2 0 %)
Cl 100 nF C2 47 pF
C4 220 pF C5 120 pF
C3 330 pF
Table 1 0 .2 .a . Parts List of Central Processing Unit.
Transistors
TRI 2N2905 TR2 2N 2906
Crystal
XTALl 4M Hz
Table 1 0 .2 .b . Parts List of Central Processing Unit.
Hex Address Function
6FE0 Frame Length Register.
6FF0 Command Word W rite ,
6 FF2 FIFO W rite.
6FF4 FIFO Read.
6 FF6 Control and Status Register.
6 FF8 In itiate Command.
6 FFA Command Word Read.
6 FFC Interrupt Flip Flop.
6 FFE Reset Interface.
Table 1 0 .3 . 1553B Interface Memory Addresses.
X I 74LS244 X2 74LS244 X3 Am2812
X4 Am2812 X5 74LS374 X6 74LS374
X7 74LS138 X8 74LS165 X9 74LS165
XIO 74LS04 X I I 74LS08 X12 74LS32
X I 3 74LS30 X I4 74LS165 X I5 74LS165
X I 6 74LS00 X I 7 74LS244 X I 8 74LS244
X19 74LS02 X20 74LS08 X21 74LS74
X22 74LS157 X23 74LS11 X24 74LS74
X25 74LS74 X26 74LS174 X27 9324
X28 74LS193 X29 74LS00 X30 74LS279
X31 74LS74 X32 74LS08 X33 74LS123
X34 74LS08 X35 74LS74 X36 74LS04
X37 74LS193 X38 74LS00 X39 74LS02
X40 74LS32 X 4 l 74LS74 X42 74LS154
X43 74LS260 X44 74LS193 X45 DIL SWITCH
X46 74LS74 X47 74LS11 . X48 74LS74
X49 74LS74 X50 74LS244 X51 74LS74
X52 74LS08 X53 74LS74 X54 74LS74
X55 74LS08 X56 74LS74 X57 74LS157
X58 DIL SWITCH
Resistors ( -  5% )
RI -  R16 IK
R17 150K
R18 lOK
R19 -  R24 I K
Cgpaci tors C" 20%) 
a  lOnF
C2 lOOpF
Table 1 0 .4 . Parts List of 1553B/Microprocessor Interface Board 1.
Integrated Circuits
X I 74LS00 X2 75452 X3 HA2522
X4 HA4905 X5 74LS00 X 6 -
X7 15530 X 8 74LS124 X9 74LS374
XIO 74LS157 X I I 74LS164 X12 9324
X I 3 74LS164 X14 74LS164 X15 74LS08
X I 6 74LS04 X I 7 74LS00 X18 74LS00
X19 74LS74 X20 74LS00 X21 -
X22 74LS374 X23 74LS374 X24 74LS374
X25 74LS32
Resistors ( -  5% )
R1 10K R2 10K R3 -
R4 47 R5 270 R6 IK
R7 10 R8 27 R9 22K
RIO 22K R11 47 R12 270
R13 4K7 R14 - R15 10K
R16 10K R17 IK R18 2K2
R19 2 2 R20 2 2 R21 2K2
R22 2 K2 R23 10K R24 10K
R25 10K R26 IK R27 IK
R28 IK R29 IK
Capacitors ( -  20% )
Cl lOpF C2 lOOpF C3 lOOpF
C4 680pF C5 6 8 pF C6 lOpF
C7 lOpF
Diodes
D1 -  D4 IN 916
D5 -  D8  C 0 4 6
Table 1 0 .5 .g. Parts List of 1553B/Microprocessor Interface Board 2 ,
Transistors


















C3 C2 Cl CO Frame length
0 1 0 1
(Bit Periods) 
6
0 1 1 0 7
0 1 1 1 8
1 0 0 0 9
1 0 0 1 10
1 0 1 0 11
1 0 1 1 12
1 1 0 0 13
1 1 0 1 14
1 1 1 0 15
1 1 1 1 16
0 0 0 0 17
0 0 0 1 18
0 0 1 0 19
0 0 1 I 2 0
0 1 0 0 21
0 1 0 1 2 2
0 1 1 0 23
0 1 1 1 24
1 0 0 0 25
1 0 0 1 26
1 0 1 0 27
1 0 1 1 28
1 1 0 0 29
1 1 0 1 30
1 1 1 0 31
1 1 1 1 32
Table 1 0 .6 . a . Frame Length Adjustment.
Data Bit Number Titli Function
6 DECODER PARITY A logical '1 ' sets even parity
5 ENCODER PARITY A logical *1 ' sets odd parity
4 C4 )
3 C3 \ These bits set the frame
2 C2
\ length as overleaf.
1 C l ))
0 CO )
Table 1 0 .6 .b. Frame Length Adjustment.
Integrated Circuits. 
X I 74LS00 X2 75452 X3 HA2522
X4 HA4905 X5 74LS00 X 6 -
X7 15531 X 8 74LS124 X9 74LS30
X IO 74LS138 X I 1 74LS374 X12 74LS374
X I 3 74LS157 X14 74LS157 X15 9324
X I 6 74LS164 X17 74LS00 X18 74LS08
X19 74LS04 X20 74LS00 X21 74LS00
X22 74LS74 X23 74LS00 X24 74LS374
X25 74LS374 X26 74LS374 X27 74LS32
X28 74LS123 X26 74LS125
Resistors ( -  5% ) 
R1 lOK R2 lOK R3
R4 47 R5 270 R6 IK
R7 10 R8 27 R9 22K
RIO 22K R ll 47 R12 270
R13 4K7 R14 - R15 lOK
R16 lOK R17 IK R18 2K2
R19 2 2 R20 2 2 R21 2K2
R22 2 K2 R23 lO K R24 lOK
R25 lOK R26 IK R27 IK
R28 IK R29 IK R30 IK
R31 IK R32 9K1 R33 IK
R34 IK
Capacitors ( -  2 0 %) 
C l lOpF C2 lOOpF C3 lOOpF
C4 680pF C5 6 8 pF C6 lOpF
C7 lOpF C8 1 uF
Table 10. 7 .a . Parts List of 1553B Protocol Fault Injection
Diodes
D1 -  D4 IN 916
D5 -  D8  C 0 4 6
Transistors





Table 1 0 .7 .b. Parts List of 1553B Protocol Fault Injection Board.
1 . Software Interrupt i f  vector not set,
2 . Jump Relative to Program Counter.
3 . Call subroutine relative to Program Counter.
4 . Call subroutine with direct address.
5 . Unimplemented instruction.
6 . Invalid instruction (known action).
7 . Invalid instruction (unknown action).
8 . Load Program Counter and Status Word.
9 . H alt
10. POP stack
11. PUSH stack.
12. Jump to direct address.
Table 11 .1 .  Major Causes of Microprocessor System Crash.
Integrated circuits 
X I 74LS32 
X4 74LS08 
X7 MM 2114  
XIO  M M 2114
X2 74LS00 
X5 M M 2114  
X8 M M 2114  
x n  M M 2114
X3 74LS32 
X6 AAM2114 
X9 M M 2114  
X12 M M 2114
Table 12.1.  Parts List of 4K Memory Board.
